Clean up your own mess: An experimental study of moral responsibility and efficiency

Abstract

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Nonrenewable Resources, Strategic Behavior and the Hotelling Rule: An Experiment

“…[2015]; Jakob et al . [2017]; or see Sturm and Weimann [2006] and Croson and Treich [2014] for reviews of this literature). Our experiment also relates to earlier experiments on dynamic optimization (Chermak and Krause [2002]; Fischer et al .…”

Pricing externalities and moral behaviour

“…The matching of judges and producers to markets for the determination of experimental payoffs was implemented in the following way: after producers' decisions were collected, one producer with a valuation equal to each of the 10 values in the interval of [3 Euro;12 Euro] was randomly picked and assigned to one market. Due to the ex-ante uncertain number of experimental producers, we were not always able to form complete markets with exactly 10 producers.…”

“…Most previous experimental studies on emissions markets centered on details of specific market designs 9 , yet these studies do not consider the externality caused by trading in emission markets 10 . Some recent experiments have provided evidence of a willingness to pay a premium for a positive environmental impact 11 and for a motivation to remove negative externalities 12 . Finally, some studies have elicited individuals' willingness to pay to avoid real-world CO2 emissions [13][14][15][16][17] .…”

“…In our experiment, participants act either as "producers" or "judges." Each of the 10 producers in one market is randomly assigned an (integer) valuation from the interval [3 Euro,12 Euro] such that each value is assigned only once. The distribution of possible valuations and one's own realized position in the distribution is known to all market participants.…”

Pigou in the 21st Century: a tribute on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the publication of The Economics of Welfare

“…In the same vein, Sandel ( 2012 ), raises fundamental moral objections to market mechanisms. Moreover, in an experimental setting, Jakob et al ( 2017 ) have shown that market-based policies, while efficient, conflict with moral behavior. According to the authors, moral responsibility induced study participants to take inefficient actions that reduced the earnings of the whole group of participants.…”