Clientelism and governance

Bardhan, Pranab

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105797

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Furthermore, the patronage and clientelist dynamics, remnants of labor exploitation at the height of cronyism under the authoritarian Philippines, are still evident and perhaps deepening in the present day (Bardhan, 2022; Beg, 2021). The unfair labor conditions embedded in this traditional labor system and dynamics have chained the laborer to their marginalization to the point that they just acknowledge and accept, or are even forced to do so, the kind of system that they are in and recognize that the patronage and the clientelist system will forever exist in this generation and the next to come (Rai, 2018; Scoones et al, 2016).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is It Worth Enduring? Labor in Philippine Mango Fruit Farming

Sacramento,

Cañete

2023

Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy: A triannual Journ

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This article examines the process of labor exploitation in mango fruit farming in the Philippines. It provides a case study based on primary data collected through key informant interviews as well as secondary data. The article argues that contemporary mango fruit farming remains within the conventional labor dynamics inherited from historical capitalist domination and exploitation. The drive for transformative development has favored orchard owners and financiers leaving aside laborers’ well-being, welfare, and safety nets. Moreover, the ideological normalization of laborers’ dire conditions has led to acceptance of whatever conditions are allowed by powerful actors. The plight of laborers in the mango fruit industry remains a relevant and continuing struggle that requires relentless advocacy.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is It Worth Enduring? Labor in Philippine Mango Fruit Farming

Sacramento,

Cañete

2023

Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy: A triannual Journ

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“…I use Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) definition of elite capture, which refers to richer members of society taking action to increase their de facto political power at the expense of the poor. I define corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain (Bardhan, 2022) These constraints, furthermore, protect minorities from the "tyranny of the majority" (L ührmann et al, 2018). It is therefore imperative to distinguish between the de facto implementation of democratic institutions that enforce these additional constraints on the executive (hereafter "liberal democracies") and the de jure adoption of such institutions, which does not usually involve the enforcement of such constraints (hereafter "electoral democracies") (L ührmann et al, 2018).…”

Section: Democracy Redistribution and Inequalitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Generally, clientelism is more likely to thrive in democracies with high levels of economic inequality and poverty and low trust in state capacity, tendencies that are particularly pronounced in young democracies (Keefer and Vlaicu, 2008;. 12 Clientelism in democracies constrains the de facto political power of the poor because it undermines elections as a vehicle for representation and as a mechanism for holding policymakers accountable and, furthermore, it impedes the quality of governance Bardhan, 2022;Lindberg et al, 2022). Accordingly, clientelism shapes both the extent to which politicians supply and voters demand programmatic redistribution (Acemoglu et al, 2011;Larreguy et al, 2016;Fergusson et al, 2020).…”

Section: Clientelism and Demand For Redistributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Essays on Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality

Koob

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Economic inequality continues to thrive in democracies across the world. This is puzzling because theory predicts that the ideals of democracy should induce more equal societies. At the same time, high levels of inequality tend to undermine democratic institutions. It may be that many democracies are trapped in a vicious cycle of persistent economic inequality and democratic backsliding, which may be difficult to alter. The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the general question of why inequality persists in democracies with a focus on the means by which the poor can exert political influence to remedy persistent inequality and why they may fail to do so. The dissertation consists of three independent chapters. Each addresses the links between democracy, redistribution and inequality from different angles. In Chapter 1, I examine the general link between democracy and economic inequality by analysing the distributional dynamics of economic growth in democracies relative to autocracies. The chapter shows that democracies are, on average, no better than autocracies when it comes to inclusive economic growth (growth that is associated with a reduction in economic inequality). However, when countries are classified according to their de facto implementation of democratic institutions, liberal democracies do foster inclusive growth in both relative and absolute terms. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 focus on the political power of the poor to influence redistributive policies in electoral democracies. Each chapter examines different forms of political action that are available to the poor. Chapter 2 focuses on voting and on the impact of clientelism, which may shape how elections serve to channel demand for programmatic redistribution into the political system. The chapter shows that clientelism adversely affects voter support for political candidates regardless of efforts to provide programmatic redistribution. Chapter 3 focuses on protest as an alternative (or complementary) form of political action to influence redistribution when the electoral process is curtailed. The chapter shows that the poor may hold some de facto political power by virtue of protests. However, the magnitude of that power depends on the choice of protest tactics. The dissertation arrives at these novel insights by employing both observational and experimental quantitative research designs with an emphasis on causal inference. The research questions are analysed both across countries and among individual voters in two unequal electoral democracies; Brazil and South Africa. The dissertation adds to the understanding on the causes of equilibria of persistent inequality, low programmatic redistribution, and democratic backsliding, which are liable to emerge when poor citizens are deprived of political power - at the ballot box or in the streets.

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The Philippines: a social structure of corruption

Guth

2024

Crime Law Soc Change

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Clientelism and governance

Abstract: This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER project Clientelist politics and economic development -theories, perspectives and new directions.

Cited by 8 publications

References 27 publications

Is It Worth Enduring? Labor in Philippine Mango Fruit Farming

Is It Worth Enduring? Labor in Philippine Mango Fruit Farming

Essays on Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality

The Philippines: a social structure of corruption

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