Clientelism and Social Funds: Evidence from Chávez's Misiones

Abstract

The latest president in Latin America to adopt social funds on a large scale as an integral part of his government program has been Hugo Chávez Frías of Venezuela. Based on the literature on clientelism and social funds in Latin America, this article finds that Venezuela's latest experiments with social funds were influenced by political variables. It uses empirical data from the distribution of resources for some of the subnational misiones programs to show how, given increased levels of electoral competition and weak institutional constraints, the government used these funds clientelistically, even while distributing oil income to the very poor. Chávez's misiones served two very different purposes: to manipulate the political context and to distribute funds directly to the low‐income population.

Compulsory Voting and Income Inequality: Evidence for Lijphart's Proposition from Venezuela

“…We know, retrospectively, that Chávez became the icon of Latin America's new left, and we know about the redistributive policies he eventually pursued under the banner of twenty-first-century socialism (Penfold-Becerra 2007). But much of that was far from clear when Chávez was initially elected, and even beyond.…”

Dominican Party System Continuity amid Regional Transformations: Economic Policy, Clientelism, and Migration Flows

“…Because few efforts have been made to register these potential voters, the parties do not have to worry about reaching out to new clients. In this dimension, the Dominican experience stands in contrast with other countries, like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, where extensive registration and mobilization campaigns among the poor expanded the electorate and multiplied pressures for clientelist benefits (Mayorga 2005;Penfold-Becerra 2007;Van Cott 2005).…”

Does Welfare Provision Promote Democratic State Legitimacy? Evidence from Brazil’s Bolsa Família Program

“…Alternatively, scholars have argued that the express purpose of a state's provision of assistance benefits is to promote regime stability through the "regulation" or "disciplining" of the poor, independent of whether such policies support the wellbeing of their beneficiaries (e.g., Piven and Cloward 1971;Soss et al 2011). Perhaps more crucially in the Latin American context, there are several examples of populist leaders who have used public assistance programs to consolidate their personal authority, often at the expense of the political autonomy of their supporters and in opposition to the prerogatives of other branches of government (Bruhn, 1996;Brusco et al 2004;Calvo and Murillo 2004;Díaz-Cayeros 2008;Graham and Kane 1998;Magaloni et al 2009;Penfold-Becerra 2007;Rocha-Menocal 2001;Schady 2000). While such efforts may also produce specific forms of legitimacy for the incumbent among seemingly "regulated" or "disciplined" assistance-receiving followers, we do not expect that they would bolster the broader legitimacy of any components of the regime that these followers perceive to be autonomous from the populist leader.…”

“…Each of these arguments has quite different implications for normative understandings of CCT programs as mechanisms for political inclusion and the empowerment of the poor. Given past manipulations of social assistance programs for political ends in the Latin American region, where populist leaders captured the political support of poor voters through selective benefits (e.g., Penfold-Becerra 2007;Schady 2000), it is important to assess the political effects of this new generation of social programs on the region's citizens.…”