Clientelism in Indian Villages

Abstract

We study the operation of local governments (Panchayats) in rural Maharashtra, India, using a survey that we designed for this end. Elections are freely contested, fairly tallied, highly participatory, non-coerced, and lead to appointment of representative politicians. However, beneath this veneer of ideal democracy we find evidence of deeply ingrained clientelist vote-trading structures maintained through extra-political means. Elite minorities undermine policies that would redistribute income toward the majority poor. We explore the means by which elites use their dominance of land ownership and traditional social superiority to achieve political control in light of successful majoritarian institutional reforms. (JEL D72, H23, I38, J15, O15, O17, O18)

Building State Capacity: Evidence from Biometric Smartcards in India

“…200 (˜$3) per month except for disability 6 Imperfect implementation of social insurance programs may even be a deliberate choice by local elites to preserve their power over the rural poor, as they are often the default providers of credit and insurance. See Anderson et al (2013) for discussion, and also Jayachandran (2006) who shows how uninsured rainfall shocks benefit landlords and hurt workers (especially those who lack access to credit).…”

Political Economy of Reform

“…The data reveal that where political contestation using vote buying strategies is more widespread, politicians reduce investments in those service delivery instruments-in primary health-that are particularly likely to be broadly pro-poor in delivering benefits. Anderson, Francois, and Kotwal (2015) show that weakening enfranchisement through clientelist relations between land-owning elite families and agricultural households in Indian villages is associated with lower public investments in social safety nets and antipoverty programs. In related results, Baland and Robinson (2006) find historical evidence that the introduction of the secret ballot in Chile was associated with a decline in votes for right-wing parties and a drop in the price of land (both of which are consistent with a reduction in the power of clientelist relations).…”

“…While there is a lot of work examining the details of clientelist political transactions, and its political outcomes, there is relatively little work on implications of clientelist politics for the incentives of leaders who wield powers over policy-making. Although there are some theories about the negative consequences of clientelist politics for policy selection in equilibrium (Baland and Robinson, 2006;Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2012;Anderson et al, 2015), it is also conceivable that vote buying could be a form of political responsiveness to the demands or needs of voters. Gift-giving at election times and service delivery in between elections may be positively correlated, simultaneously driven by underlying conditions of demanding citizens and political contestation.…”

“…However, a few studies are beginning to provide direct empirical evidence that political leaders trade-off the provision of private benefits against that of providing broader public goods-that is, in equilibrium, clientelist politics yields under-investment in broad public goods (Khemani, 2015;Anderson et al, 2015). A survey was designed to be able to correlate vote buying with the delivery of public health services, taking advantage of an opportunity in, and an appropriate institutional context offered by the country of the Philippines (Khemani, 2015).…”

What Will Improve Governance?

“…19 Besley et al, on the other hand, found in their survey of four southern states (Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu) in India that both intra-and inter-village resource allocations were clearly driven by the self-interest of the political elite. 20 This is not to say that decentralization has had no beneficial effects for the 22 In a study of local governance in Maharashtra conducted between 2007 and 2008, they find that democracy is alive and well in form but not in substance. In panchayat (village government) elections, the voter turnout is impressive (over 90 percent), the reservation policy for women and scheduled castes and tribes is strictly implemented, and yet poverty alleviation schemes that would benefit the majority are conspicuous by their absence in the panchayat agenda.…”