Climate and Cooperation: A New Perspective on the Management of Shared Fish Stocks

Abstract

Climate regime shifts occur at irregular intervals and have profound and persistent impacts on ocean temperature and circulation patterns and on the dynamics of marine fish populations. Despite a growing scientific literature and some attention to the implications of such regime shifts for domestic fisheries, the issue has received little attention in the context of international fishery management. This paper presents evidence for the significance of climatic regime shifts, and draws upon the recent history of conflict between Canada and the United States over Pacific salmon management to illustrate the dangers that unpredicted, unanticipated environmental regime shifts pose for efforts to maintain international cooperation. This suggests a need for greater attention to this issue. Fishery agreements can be made more resilient to the impacts of such environmental changes by explicitly building in flexibility-for example, by allowing the use of side payments. In addition, pre-agreements on procedures to be followed in the event of sustained changes in fish stock productivity or migration patterns, and cooperation on developing common scientific understandings, can help to prevent destructive conflicts. Finally, the literature employing game theoretic shared-fishery models could be further developed to focus on providing practical guidance for maintaining cooperation in the presence of unpredictable and persistent environmental changes.

Zonal attachment of fish stocks and management cooperation

“…In 2008 the Atlantic mackerel began to show up in the Icelandic economic zone in large quantities, leading to disagreement on the division of the overall catch quota that has not yet (December 2012) been resolved. In the 1990s a similar dispute broke out between the United States and Canada over distribution of salmon catches, caused by an unforeseen and radical change in the migration runs of Pacific salmon (Miller and Munro, 2004).…”

Preparing ocean governance for species on the move

“…Game theory provides inviting lessons for incentivizing cooperation, including broadening the scope of negotiations to include non-fish resources (5), albeit at the risk of reducing fisheries to a mere bargaining chip as suggested by the Brexit negotiations. In the case of the USCanada Pacific Salmon Treaty, however, contributions to a conservation fund helped stabilize relations, creating an alternative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 avenue for compensation often termed a side payment (13). Similar approaches are illustrated by Norway and Russia swapping fisheries access within EEZs to balance shifts in shared stocks, an important example of flexibility in co-managing Arctic resources.…”

Emerging Adaptation Approaches for Climate-Ready Fisheries Management

“…Lack of common understanding that distribution is changing, lack of existing mechanisms for side payments (Miller and Munro, 2004) Norway/Russia examples from the Barents Sea (Miller and Munro, 2004) the stock assessment model and subjected to statistical hypothesis testing (Maunder and Watters, 2003;Deriso et al, 2008 (ICCAT, 2013). In contrast, the relationship between sablefish (Anoplopoma fimbria) recruitment and a coastal sea surface height index has been repeatedly evaluated and supported in stock assessments, though stock assessment results have not been strongly sensitive to the inclusion of the environmental index (Stewart et al, 2011).…”