Climate change: a rational choice politics view*

Abstract

Reduction in carbon dioxide emissions constitutes a global public good; and hence there will be strong incentives for countries to free ride in the provision of CO 2 emission reductions. In the absence of more or less binding international agreements, we would expect carbon emissions to be seriously excessive, and climate change problems to be unsolvable. Against this obvious general point, we observe many countries acting unilaterally to introduce carbon emission policies. That is itself an explanatory puzzle, and a source of possible hope. Both aspects are matters of 'how politics works' -i.e. 'public choice' problems are central. The object of this paper is to explain the phenomenon of unilateral policy action and to evaluate the grounds for 'hope'. One aspect of the explanation lies in the construction of policy instruments that redistribute strategically in favour of relevant interests. Another is the 'expressive' nature of voting and the expressive value of environmental concerns. Both elements -elite interests and popular (expressive) opinion -are quasi-constraints on politically viable policy. However, the nature of expressive concerns is such that significant reductions in real GDP are probably not sustainable in the long term -which suggests that much of the CO 2 reduction action will be limited to modest reductions of a largely token character. In that sense, the grounds for hope are, although not non-existent, decidedly thin.

A political economy of positions in climate change negotiations: Economic, structural, domestic, and strategic explanations

“…While we assume that a country is forced to choose a certain position on the grounds of its structural situation (vulnerability to climate change) and its economic situation, we acknowledge the necessity of integrating additional variables, such as domestic factors (a country's own environmental standards, democracy status, and domestic industry interests) and strategic aspects (a country's position in the international system) into an analysis of climate change negotiation positions.. Based on game-theoretical arguments pertaining to the free-rider problem that climate change is plagued with (Brennan 2009;Barrett and Stavins 2002), we expect states to choose a negotiation position which shifts the costs of reducing emissions to others. However, we do not believe that the desire to shift costs towards others is the only factor that influences a country's choice.…”

“…However, people do not usually have the choice of whether to pay tax or not, and a single person's influence on the implementation of new laws is usually quite limited. Brennan (2009) shows that in such circumstances the payoffs for individuals are changed such that "doing the right thing" (i.e. supporting a policy that one would reject if deciding alone) generates a higher reward than outright rejection of the policy.…”

“…Since the creation of the UNFCCC, the community of states is divided into Annex 1 countries (the developed and industrialized countries mainly responsible for climate damage), which are listed in the appendix of the organization's founding document, and non-Annex 1 countries (developing countries). This division, sometimes referred to as the "Kyoto Firewall" (Bodansky 2010), allows developing countries (non-Annex 1) to free-ride -this being their dominant strategy - (Brennan 2009;Barrett and Stavins 2002), without having to fear retaliation measures from Annex 1 countries. In the Kyoto Protocol, this division was reiterated, although this time with developed countries listed in the Annex B of the document.…”

Understanding Climate Adaptation Cultures in Global Context: Proposal for an Explanatory Framework

“…Environmental sociology has aimed at including environmental factors in its explanation [3][4][5][6] of how social behaviors form the environmental outcome, as well as how environmental context influences action. Political Economy of climate change considers the local socio-political constraints, such as issues related to power, inequality, and governance [7][8][9], whereas rational-choice theory [10,11] …”

Determinants of bargaining success in the climate change negotiations

“…As a result, some researchers portray the possibility of finding a solution to tackle the global climate crisis in rather pessimistic terms (see Helm, 2008;Brennan, 2009;Dimitrov, 2010a). It is however assumed here that coordination between players is possible and that they can either redefine the rules of the game to overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma through reciprocal expectations, or suffer the consequences of failure together (Schelling, 1960, p. 107).…”