Climate Change Sustainability: From Bargaining to Cooperative Balanced Approach

Ciano, Tiziana; Феррара, Массимилиано; Gangemi, Mariangela; Merenda, Domenica Stefania; Pansera, Bruno Antonio

doi:10.3390/g12020045

Cited by 6 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Fourth, from the perspective of the relationship between cooperative game theory and the field of climate change dynamics, Ciano et al provided a set of competitive negotiations and unified competitive solutions for cooperative games [37]. They analyzed balanced and super-balanced games from two central results related to cooperative game methods, and their model provides a theoretical basis for our research.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Game Model of Blue Carbon Collaboration along MSR—From the Regret Theory Perspective

et al. 2022

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Ocean pollution and global warming are two pressing environmental problems exacerbated by human economic behavior. Building a blue carbon cooperation platform along the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) to promote sustainable development of countries along the route is of practical value to solving these two problems. Based on the analysis and review of the latest research on blue carbon, cooperative game and MSR, Weber’s law and regret theory are introduced to establish an economic model of blue carbon international cooperation, which proves the economic feasibility of blue carbon cooperation along MSR. The influence of psychological factors on the decision making of blue carbon international cooperation is also discussed. In addition, the measures to promote international cooperation are also discussed according to the current situation of marine blue carbon resources.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on Equations ( 9) and ( 10), the allocations in the core meet not only the individual rationality, but also the alliance rationality; that is, the income of any alliance is not less than the income it can obtain independently from the allocations in the core [37].…”

Section: Cooperative Game Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Game Model of Blue Carbon Collaboration along MSR—From the Regret Theory Perspective

et al. 2022

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“…The competition between the players makes cooperation unlikely, especially due to the zero-sum nature of the game. Therefore, the approach falls into the realm of non-cooperative game theory [24] and joins game-theoretic studies of climate negotiations [25][26][27][28]. Further, there are plenty of approaches that solve the core problem of a prisoner's dilemma and provision of public goods by voluntary contributions [29,30].…”

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confidence: 99%

A Climate Alliance through Transfer: Transfer Design in an Economic Conflict Model

Neumärker

2022

World

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For decades, combating climate change has been a global challenge, which requires jointly coordinated efforts by numerous, international actors. However, it has been shown time and again that agreeing on globally binding agreements without a global government proves difficult. To this end, this paper examines the possibility of a tolerance premium. This means a transfer payment in exchange for accepting and complying with the associated agreement. The provider of this tolerance premium determines the conditions of its payment to set desired incentives. Thus, collective decision making can also be self-enforced without a higher authority. This scenario is studied analytically based on Dixit’s conflict model. The study shows that the optimal tolerance premium depends only on the value of the prize to the transferee and that this can result in a stalling of the conflict. The implications of this model shed light on the design of global climate agreements that are self-enforcing without the need for a global government. For this purpose, the upfront payment of funds and their reimbursement as a tolerance premium serve as an incentive to comply with collectively agreed rules in climate policy.

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Green economy with efficient public incentives

Galeotti

Vannucci

2023

Decisions Econ Finan

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There is a widespread interest among institutions and economic agents for a reduction of the environmental impact of the production system. An important role seems to be played by the ability of public institutions to push the transition toward a green economy also through the application of fiscal policies that envisage a system of rewards and penalties, respectively, for those companies which adopt green strategies and those which do not. It is clear that readjusting older production systems to new pollution regulations can lead in the short term to profitability reductions for the companies implementing them, even though it is possible to assume increases in profitability over medium-long time horizons. One possible approach to this issue is the classical econometric one, which analyzes the effect of different parameters of multivariate models, that influence the level of pollution due to production systems with different propensity for environmental protection. Optimal control models have been also considered with control variables relating to the technologies of production systems and public incentive policies for the green economy: see for example (Tan et al. in J Syst Sci Inf 9(1):61–73, 2021). In recent years, many scholars have studied the relationship between environmental regulation and enterprise technological innovation using evolutionary games, involving mainly economic incentives and fiscal strategies (see see Suyong et al. in Appl Math Comput 355(15):343–355, 2019; Zhang and Li in Appl Math Model 63:577–590, 2018). In our article, we propose a dynamical model where the public administration uses pollution penalties as a control variable in order to push a production sector toward better performances concerning two targets, pollution level and profitability. To this end, we consider the effects of competitiveness among firms and technology innovation.

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Climate Change Sustainability: From Bargaining to Cooperative Balanced Approach

Cited by 6 publications

References 14 publications

The Game Model of Blue Carbon Collaboration along MSR—From the Regret Theory Perspective

The Game Model of Blue Carbon Collaboration along MSR—From the Regret Theory Perspective

A Climate Alliance through Transfer: Transfer Design in an Economic Conflict Model

Green economy with efficient public incentives

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