Closed-loop supply chain coordination strategy for the remanufacture of patented products under competitive demand

Zhang, Cheng-Tang; Ren, Minglun

doi:10.1016/j.apm.2016.02.006

Cited by 94 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…The manufacturers that own patent rights to the NP item, take advantage of its proprietary rights to authorize the work to the remanufacturers. However, the manufacturers do not engage in the collection and remanufacture of EOL products, and there are many similar cases in the manufacturing industry, such as engine remanufacturing and hydraulic pump remanufacturing [4]. The remanufacturers engage in the EOL products collection and remanufacturing.…”

Section: Supply Chain Considering Consumers' Preferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Period E-Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Considering Consumers’ Preference for Products and AI-Push

2019

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The remanufacturing industry plays a significant role to improve the utilization of resources and contribute to environmental protection and sustainable development. E-commerce channel (e-channel) has become an important retail channel. The multi-period closed-loop supply chain network of electronic channels (E-CLSCN) is studied. Moreover, this study considers the influence of consumers’ preference for products and artificial intelligence push (AI-push) on network balance under the conditions of dynamic and static. The network consists of manufacturers, remanufacturers, and demand markets. Remanufacturers are responsible for collecting and remanufacturing. The multi-period E-CLSCN model is established through variational inequalities. The study finds that whether dynamic or static, consumers’ preference for new products (NP) has positively correlated with the profits of manufacturers and the whole E-CLSCN. Consumers’ preference for remanufacturer products (RP) has only positively correlated with the profits of remanufactures. In the aspect of AI-push, the manufacturers’ AI-push has positively correlated with the profits of the entire players of E-CLSCN, while the remanufacturers’ AI-push has only positively correlated with the profits of the remanufacturers. Also, considering the multi-period, the sensitivity of the demand markets for the investment of manufacturers’ and remanufacturers’ AI-push gradually reduces, and the marginal benefit of AI-push gradually decreases. Finally, this paper addresses interesting managerial insights from the perspective of government and enterprises. Under the dual objectives of environmental protection and economic interests of enterprises, this study provides a reference for governments and enterprises to develop relevant dynamic policies. Namely, the government formulates dynamic environmental protection measures, and enterprises formulate dynamic strategic plans and implement government policies. While promoting the management level of E-CLSCN, it effectively boosts the development of the remanufacturing industry and recycling sustainable economy.

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Section: Supply Chain Considering Consumers' Preferencementioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Period E-Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Considering Consumers’ Preference for Products and AI-Push

2019

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“…As Shen and Xiong suggested, CLSC can be coordinated under a revenue‐and‐expense sharing contract . Zhang and Ren developed a coordinated pricing mechanism that incorporates a revenue‐and‐sharing contract and two‐part tariff, capable of perfectly coordinating the CLSC . Xie et al .…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Shen and Xiong suggested, CLSC can be coordinated under a revenue-and-expense sharing contract [26]. Zhang and Ren developed a coordinated pricing mechanism that incorporates a revenue-and-sharing contract and two-part tariff, capable of perfectly coordinating the CLSC [27]. Xie et al developed a revenue-sharing mechanism by considering the relationship between the recycle rate and the recycle revenue-sharing ratio [28].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative decision in a closed‐loop supply chain considering carbon emission reduction and low‐carbon promotion

Wang

Shang

et al. 2018

Env Prog and Sustain Energy

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This study examines manufacturers' carbon emission reduction level and retailers' low‐carbon promotion effort in a low‐carbon closed‐loop supply chain (CLSC), in which a manufacturer directly collects the used‐products from consumers. Considering both the carbon emission reduction level and low‐carbon promotion effort depending on the market demands, this study investigates the optimal decisions and performances of CLSC under four different game structures, that is, one non‐cooperative structure and three cooperative structures. In the non‐cooperative structure, the manufacturer controls the carbon emission level, the collection level as well as the wholesale price, while the retailer controls the low‐carbon promotion effort and retail price. The cooperative structures consist of one‐way and two‐way cooperation. In one‐way cooperative structure, the manufacturer shares only a part of retailer's low‐carbon promotion cost. In two‐way cooperative structure, the retailer shares partial manufacturer's carbon emission reduction cost or collection cost based on the one‐way cooperative structure. It shows that the two‐way cooperative structure of the co‐op promotion and carbon emission reduction is the optimal in pricing decisions and carbon emission reduction level, as well as two‐way cooperative structure of the co‐op promotion and collection is the optimal in the collection effort. Under lower the consumer's low‐carbon preferences, the retailer agrees to share the manufacturer's collection cost. When the consumer's low‐carbon preferences are higher, the retailer agrees to share the manufacturer's carbon emission reduction cost. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Environ Prog, 38: 143–153, 2019

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“… analyzed the influence of the local advertising on CLSC channel members’ pricing strategies, collection decision and profits. Zhang and Ren employed an integrated view to study the CLSC coordination strategy for the remanufacture of patented products under competitive demand. Esmaeili et al .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hong et al [18] analyzed the influence of the local advertising on CLSC channel members' pricing strategies, collection decision and profits. Zhang and Ren [19] employed an integrated view to study the CLSC coordination strategy for the remanufacture of patented products under competitive demand. Esmaeili et al [20] studied the collection behavior of players in a two echelon CLSC and developed pricing models for different collecting strategies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Closed‐loop supply chain network static equilibrium and dynamics under pollution permits system

Yang

Huang

Zhang

et al. 2018

Env Prog and Sustain Energy

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A closed‐loop supply chain network including multi‐manufacturing/remanufacturing firms and multi‐demand markets is considered. We present equilibrium conditions for decision‐makers in the network and develop a static model with marketable pollution permits and noncompliant behavior, using the variational inequality theory. We provide qualitative analysis of the model. Then, using the projected dynamical system, we propose a dynamic model. The results show that the set of stationary points of dynamic model coincides with the set of solutions of static model. Finally, numerical examples are proposed. The equilibrium results including production output of new products, the forward and reverse product flows, the prices of product, the prices of license, the number of licenses, and the possible noncompliant overflows and underflows of the waste are obtained. We find that increase in the unit penalty cost contributes to decrease in waste emission from firms in the network, and when the unit penalty cost increase to a certain level, they no longer choose excess emission of waste. © 2018 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Environ Prog, 38:e13021, 2019

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Closed-loop supply chain coordination strategy for the remanufacture of patented products under competitive demand

Cited by 94 publications

References 20 publications

Multi-Period E-Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Considering Consumers’ Preference for Products and AI-Push

Multi-Period E-Closed-Loop Supply Chain Network Considering Consumers’ Preference for Products and AI-Push

Cooperative decision in a closed‐loop supply chain considering carbon emission reduction and low‐carbon promotion

Closed‐loop supply chain network static equilibrium and dynamics under pollution permits system

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