Cloud economics results from amassing computation resources while being able to distribute workload in space and time. The backbone of this ability is virtualization, which abstracts the host hardware, sharing virtual machines. This means of interface is also a primary vehicle and target for attackers. The counter-measures to this threat consider the costs and benefits to the cloud’s essential functions. Where the future development of the cloud is also considered, this competition between attackers and victims is analogous to those modeled in extended game theory. Yet, the attacker and victim costs and benefits, expressed as utility measures necessary for game-theory methods, are elusive quantities. This paper establishes such a game as a predator-prey contest played out on a data-center environment. A set of contestant parameters are applied at the threshold of a viable model to the recognizable boundaries. Measurement of system health is extracted in relief with individual cost, benefit, and risk. An examination of metrics capable of validating extended interaction is developed. This establishes a baseline model for more elaborate expression of security in cloud economics.