Clustering-Based Bidding Languages for Sponsored Search

Mahdian, Mohammad; Wang, Grant

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04128-0_15

Cited by 11 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…For example, Mahdian and Wang [2009] showed that if the keyword set that an advertiser can bid on is preassigned, there may not exist a pure Nash equilibrium for the broad-match GSP mechanism. The nonexistence of pure Nash equilibrium is also observed in Dhangwatnotai [2012], under a more reasonable circumstance.…”

Section: Gsp For Broad-match Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…As a result, the ads that bid on different keywords may compete with each other in an auction. The mechanism design and game-theoretic analysis in this setting have been investigated in Mahdian and Wang [2009], Dhangwatnotai [2011Dhangwatnotai [ , 2012, and Chen et al [2014]. -Advertisers' behavior models: It has been widely observed that advertisers are not fully rational and sometimes do not take the best responses.…”

Section: Part Ii: Advanced Topicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Even Dar et al [2009] showed that the bid optimization problem in the broad-match setting is NP-hard and is inapproximable with any reasonable constant approximation ratio unless P = N P. Second, it becomes unclear whether the known theoretical properties of the GSP mechanism still hold in the broad-match setting. Several pieces of research [Mahdian and Wang 2009;Dhangwatnotai 2011Dhangwatnotai , 2012Chen et al 2014] have been conducted to gain understanding on this topic. In the following subsections, we will make brief introductions to these theoretical studies.…”

Section: Broad Match Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Sponsored Search Auctions

Qin

Chen

Liu

2015

ACM Trans. Intell. Syst. Technol.

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Sponsored search has been proven to be a successful business model, and sponsored search auctions have become a hot research direction. There have been many exciting advances in this field, especially in recent years, while at the same time, there are also many open problems waiting for us to resolve. In this article, we provide a comprehensive review of sponsored search auctions in hopes of helping both industry practitioners and academic researchers to become familiar with this field, to know the state of the art, and to identify future research topics. Specifically, we organize the article into two parts. In the first part, we review research works on sponsored search auctions with basic settings, where fully rational advertisers without budget constraints, preknown click-through rates (CTRs) without interdependence, and exact match between queries and keywords are assumed. Under these assumptions, we first introduce the generalized second price (GSP) auction, which is the most popularly used auction mechanism in the industry. Then we give the definitions of several well-studied equilibria and review the latest results on GSP's efficiency and revenue in these equilibria. In the second part, we introduce some advanced topics on sponsored search auctions. In these advanced topics, one or more assumptions made in the basic settings are relaxed. For example, the CTR of an ad could be unknown and dependent on other ads; keywords could be broadly matched to queries before auctions are executed; and advertisers are not necessarily fully rational, could have budget constraints, and may prefer rich bidding languages. Given that the research on these advanced topics is still immature, in each section of the second part, we provide our opinions on how to make further advances, in addition to describing what has been done by researchers in the corresponding direction.

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Section: Gsp For Broad-match Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Part Ii: Advanced Topicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Broad Match Auctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Multi-keyword sponsored search

Dhangwatnotai

2011

Proceedings of the 12th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

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We investigate search engines' mechanism for allocating impressions generated from different search terms. This mechanism is equivalent to running an independent GSP auction for each search term only when the number of search terms is small. In practice, the number of search terms is so large that an advertiser cannot possibly communicate to the search engine all the GSP auctions that he wishes to participate in. For example, a travel agency is interested in all search terms pertaining to flight, including "flight to boston", "ticket to SFO", "cheap airfare", etc. Therefore, the search engine introduces broad match keywords as a bidding language that allows an advertiser to submit a bid for multiple GSP auctions at once. However, with broad match keywords, the GSP auctions are no longer independent, i.e. an advertiser's bid in one auction may depend on his bid in another auction.We propose the broad match mechanism as a model that captures this aspect of the multi-keyword sponsored search mechanism. We study the performance of this mechanism under the price of anarchy (POA) framework. We identify two properties of broad match keywords, namely expressiveness and homogeneity, that characterize the POA and we prove almost tight bounds on the POA. The bounds allow us to explore trade-offs between the two properties. We introduce the exact-match-only mechanism whose performance, when compared to that of broad match mechanisms, gives us an insight into the net benefit of broad match keywords. The broad match mechanism can also be viewed as a mechanism that copes with severe communication constraint i.e. the valuation of an advertiser is described by many more numbers than the search engine can solicit.

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“…The setting of additive utilities for a large number of goods (motivated by sponsored search auctions) was studied by Mahdian and Wang [2]. Their focus is on a specific class of bidding languages called clustering-based bidding languages that are similar to the broad match scheme used in sponsored search systems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders

Kumar

Mahdian

Sayedi

2009

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem with this mechanism is that it requires the buyers to specify a large number of values. In this paper we study the problem of designing optimal mechanisms subject to constraints on the complexity of the bidding language in a setting where buyers have additive valuations for a large set of goods. This setting is motivated by sponsored search auctions, where the valuations of the advertisers are more or less additive, and the number of keywords that are up for sale is huge. We give a complete solution for this problem when the valuations of the buyers are drawn from simple classes of prior distributions. For a more realistic class of priors, we show that a mechanism akin to the broad match mechanism currently in use provides a reasonable bicriteria approximation.

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Clustering-Based Bidding Languages for Sponsored Search

Cited by 11 publications

References 16 publications

Sponsored Search Auctions

Sponsored Search Auctions

Multi-keyword sponsored search

Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders

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