Coalition composition and legislative outcomes in Italy

Unifying the field of comparative judicial politics: towards a general theory of judicial behaviour

“…These features of the judicial process were thought to rule out any empirical testing of the attitudinal model in Europe (see e.g. Volcansek, 2000: 7). Three recent studies, however, have shown that the attitudinal model can be fruitfully applied to European courts too.…”

“…Scholars have focused on various institutional variables to explain variations in judicial policy-making over time and among countries: constitutional rigidity (Alter, 1998: 135–42, 2001: 195–8; Lijphart, 1999: 228–30; Stone Sweet, 2004: 25–6); the ideological distance between the disputants or between that of the legislative majority and the opposition when the latter challenges a law before the courts (Stone Sweet, 1999); the number of veto-players in the legislative or constitution-amending process (Tsebelis, 2002); the policy preferences of the legislature and the executive (Eskridge, 1991a, b; Volcansek, 2001); public support (Lijphart, 1999: 216–31; Volcansek, 2000: 11; Vanberg, 2001, 2005); or precedents (see Spaeth and Segal, 1999; Shapiro and Stone Sweet, 2002: ch. 2; Stone Sweet, 2004).…”

“…Between judicial self-censorship and judicial supremacy, there will of course be contentious situations where no player has the upper hand. In political systems with modestly powerful courts, such as Italy or Spain (Cooter and Ginsburg, 1996; Lijphart, 1999; Volcansek, 2000), this would appear to be the dominant equilibrium.…”

“…At first blush, an overview of the literature suggests a fragmented field with competing theories making mutually exclusive claims about the way certain variables affect the jurisprudence of particular tribunals or the voting behaviour of particular judges. Moreover, it has been argued that the methods employed by political scientists to study the American judiciary could not be applied to the study of judicial politics in Europe (Stone Sweet, 2000: 49; Volcansek, 2000: 7; Rehder, 2007: 17). This study, however, attempts to refute these views.…”

Constitutional courts as veto players: Divorce and decrees in Italy

“…Bargaining difficulties in the legislative sphere arise from the instability of coalitions, the extent of party discipline, and the existence of more than one legislative chamber. Those problems, incidentally, plague the executive as well, and the number of decree laws presented is related to the number of parties included in a coalition (Volcansek 1999). Executive policy expertise and time constraints bolster the government's bargaining position, however, on most policies.…”