Coalition-Formation as a Result of Policy and Office Motivations in the German Federal States

Shikano, Susumu; Linhart, Eric

doi:10.1177/1354068809339539

Cited by 27 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…This means that coalition partners may strike package deals that cut across the division of ministerial posts and the agreement of policy priorities, so that ministerial posts might be exchanged for a commitment to a particular policy reform and vice versa. Thus, it may be argued that payoff allocation in coalition negotiations should be conceptualized as a two-dimensional process in which the allocation of ministerial portfolios cannot be treated independently from direct policy payoff allocation (Linhart & Pappi, 2009; Shikano & Linhart, 2010). For simplicity, we have not taken the distribution of portfolios into account here, but in future research, we aim to analyze the potential trade-offs between portfolio and policy payoffs for political parties when they negotiate a coalition deal (see also Bäck et al, 2011).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition Agreements, Issue Attention, and Cabinet Governance

Klüver

Bäck²

2019

Comparative Political Studies

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Why do coalition parties settle some policy issues in great detail, whereas other issues are hardly mentioned in coalition agreements? Coalition agreements are important policy platforms that determine policy making during the legislative term. However, we know remarkably little about their content. We shed light on why issue attention in coalition agreements varies so extensively. We argue that intra-cabinet conflict positively affects issue attention as parties have stronger incentives to negotiate a detailed policy agenda that constrains their coalition partners. However, we expect that this effect is conditioned by preference tangentiality and the salience of an issue among coalition partners. Our theoretical expectations are tested drawing on a new data set based on a comprehensive content analysis of 224 agreements negotiated by 181 parties between 1945 and 2015 in 24 West and East European countries. We find support for our hypotheses and conclude that parties draft agreements to limit “ministerial drift.”

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coalition Agreements, Issue Attention, and Cabinet Governance

Klüver

Bäck²

2019

Comparative Political Studies

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“…Our methods proposed here account for the multidimensionality of policy spaces. 46 Another contribution of this paper is the inclusion of confidence intervals around the estimated ideological …”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ideological Signals of German Parties in a Multi-Dimensional Space: An Estimation of Party Preferences Using the CMP Data

Linhart¹,

Shikano²

2009

German Politics

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In this paper, we present a method based on the CMP data to identify parties' ideological signals. Although our approach uses the same data as others, our method is different in that we distinguish the methods for the directional and proximity models which have long been relevant for the theoretical literature. We apply our method for all German Bundestag parties between 1949 and 2005. One problem with policy preferences is that various -and sometimes only slightly deviating -approaches lead to rather different results. Thus, we test our method in terms of its robustness using the Jackknife method. We also show confidence intervals around policy positions.

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“…den Grünen waren, bevorzugten aber dennoch die Bildung von kleinen Koalitionen, in denen sie sich mehr Macht sichern konnten (für detailliertere Studien vgl. Linhart 2009;Shikano/Linhart 2009).…”

Section: Einleitung*unclassified

“…Minderheitskoalitionen brauchen im legislativen Spiel die Zustimmung weiterer Parteien und müssen -Spezialfälle ausgenommen -eventuell Vorschläge außerhalb ihrer eigenen Pareto-Menge anbieten, um weitere, für eine parlamentarische Mehrheit notwendige Parteien einzubinden (vgl. ebenfalls Kropp/Sturm 1998: 107;Shikano/Linhart 2009). In solchen Fällen können sich Regierungen durchaus auf wechselnde Mehrheiten stützen, indem sie bei einer Entscheidung die eine, bei einer anderen Entscheidung eine andere Partei der Opposition mit ins Boot holen.…”

Section: Nutzenbewertungen Der äMteraufteilungunclassified

Koalitionsbildungen zwischen Ämter- und Politikmotivation. Konstruktion einer interdependenten Nutzenfunktion

Linhart

Pappi

2009

PVS

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Zusammenfassung: Während neuere Koalitionstheorien der Tatsache Rechnung tragen, dass Parteien bei der Bildung von Koalitionen sowohl ämter-als auch politikmotiviert sind, bleibt ein Problem bei diesen Ansätzen weiterhin ungelöst, nämlich die Berücksichtigung der Tatsache, dass Ämterbesetzung und Politikergebnisse untrennbar miteinander verflochten sind und nicht separat voneinander behandelt werden können. Aufbauend auf den neueren koalitionstheoretischen Ansätzen leisten wir einen Beitrag zur Lösung dieses Problems, indem wir eine Nutzenfunktion konstruieren, die die Interdependenz beider Motivationstypen berücksichtigt. Am Beispiel der Koalitionsbildung nach der Bundestagswahl 2002 verdeutlichen wir Implikationen unserer Nutzenfunktion und zeigen auf, dass sie die Interdependenzen tatsächlich erfassen kann.Abstract: While newer coalition theories take into account that parties are both office and policy motivated, one problem remains unsolved: the fact that offices (ministries) and policies are inseparably connected with each other. In this essay, we solve this problem by constructing a utility function which considers the interdependency of office distributions and policy outputs. This utility function -which can be used as a basis for further coalition theories -is able to capture the interdependencies also in empirical applications, as we illustrate for the example of the coalition building process after the Bundestag elections of 2002.

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Coalition-Formation as a Result of Policy and Office Motivations in the German Federal States

Cited by 27 publications

References 24 publications

Coalition Agreements, Issue Attention, and Cabinet Governance

Coalition Agreements, Issue Attention, and Cabinet Governance

Ideological Signals of German Parties in a Multi-Dimensional Space: An Estimation of Party Preferences Using the CMP Data

Koalitionsbildungen zwischen Ämter- und Politikmotivation. Konstruktion einer interdependenten Nutzenfunktion

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