coalition governance and foreign policy decision-making

Oppermann, Kai; Brummer, Klaus; Willigen, Niels van

doi:10.1057/s41304-016-0082-7

Cited by 12 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…Her framework, dissecting party ideologies along their interpretations of sovereignty, multilateralism, political community, use of force, NATO and the EU, offers a very good starting point for further analyses, especially for constructivist scholars. A different, yet equally promising path is taken by Brummer and Oppermann, both in this issue and elsewhere Brummer 2014, 2020;Oppermann, Brummer, and Van Willigen 2017). They develop the connection between parties and foreign policy through a theorisation of coalition governments.…”

Section: Individuals and Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conclusion: German Foreign Policy in the (post-)Corona World

Eberle¹

2020

German Politics

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Section: Individuals and Institutionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conclusion: German Foreign Policy in the (post-)Corona World

Eberle¹

2020

German Politics

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“…1 While all ministers attend full cabinet meetings, cabinet committees comprise only of some of these ministers (see also Appendix D). Cabinet Committees are commonly mentioned as control mechanisms to avoid inter-party agency loss in multiparty governments (Martin and Vanberg, 2013;Oppermann et al, 2017;Dragu and Laver, 2019). In single-party governments, cabinet committees have also been mentioned as playing an important role in the centralization of intraexecutive decision-making processes (Heffernan, 2003;Ie, 2022: 118;Dunleavy, 2003).…”

Section: Ministers' Legislative Activityrisks Of Ministerial Drift An...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Control from the core? The impact of cabinet committees on ministers’ legislative activity

Nielsen

2023

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Ministers may be powerful policy initiators, but they are not equally powerful. Cabinet control mechanisms have become a crucial part of cabinet governance, which can serve to contain agency loss and consequently constrain ministers in the policymaking process. However, empirical studies have not focused on the impact of such control mechanisms on individual ministers’ political outcomes. I turn attention to certain cabinet committees as intra-cabinet control mechanisms and argue that members of these enjoy a policymaking advantage compared to nonmembers. Analyzing ministers’ number of laws proposed to parliament in Denmark from 1975 to 2022, I look beyond parties as unitary actors and provide evidence for this causal relationship. Membership of the Economic Committee increases ministers’ legislative activity. Thus, even within parties in cabinet, ministers have unequal possibilities to act as policy-seeking. These findings offer new insights into political parties in governments, cabinet governance, policymaking, and legislative processes.

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“…Third, coalition agreements may allow significant discretion to individual ministers, or secure veto powers over a particular policy area. Oppermann et al (2017) theorize that a government with high ministerial discretion, with the junior party holding the foreign ministry, creates maximum opportunity for hijacking. 1 Several attributes typical of junior parties can make them particularly assertive.…”

Section: Multiparty Coalitions and Foreign Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

Foreign policy anarchy in multiparty coalitions: When junior parties take rogue decisions

Greene

2019

European Journal of International Relations

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How do disagreements within multiparty coalitions affect foreign policy, and how can junior parties exert their influence? These questions are of growing importance as new media increases domestic pressure on politicians to interject in international events, and as foreign affairs become more salient in domestic political contestation. Whereas prior research on foreign policy in multiparty coalitions focuses on the influence of junior parties over cabinet decisions, this article proposes a new theoretical concept of ‘rogue decisions’ to describe a distinct outcome of partisan disagreements. Rogue decisions are autonomous decisions by junior parties impacting foreign affairs, taken without cabinet coordination, that undermine their senior partners’ foreign policies. This resembles the ‘anarchy model’ of foreign policy previously attributed to less institutionalized systems. Having identified the necessary conditions that make rogue decisions possible, and the factors that increase their likelihood, the analysis is applied to cases in Britain and Israel. These represent polar opposite parliamentary systems, with Israel among the most proportional, where rogue decisions may be most expected, and Britain the most majoritarian, where they would be least expected. The identification of rogue decisions in contrasting parliamentary democracies challenges the assumption that cabinet is where foreign policy disagreements are managed, according to established decision-making rules. The article therefore prompts new thinking about the potential for junior parties to disrupt the foreign policy agendas of their senior partners, and challenges in new ways the assumption that states act as coherent units.

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coalition governance and foreign policy decision-making

Cited by 12 publications

References 36 publications

Conclusion: German Foreign Policy in the (post-)Corona World

Conclusion: German Foreign Policy in the (post-)Corona World

Control from the core? The impact of cabinet committees on ministers’ legislative activity

Foreign policy anarchy in multiparty coalitions: When junior parties take rogue decisions

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