Coalition Government and Committee Power

Zubek, Radosław

doi:10.1080/01402382.2015.1045322

Cited by 23 publications

(28 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Our model merges the compromise and ministerial autonomy approaches by considering how political institutions limit ministerial autonomy in policy making. First, legislative institutions -most importantly the powers of parliamentary committees and the allocation of committee chairs -serve coalition partners to 'police the bargain' (Carroll & Cox 2012;Fortunato et al 2017;Kim & Loewenberg 2005;Martin & Vanberg 2004, 2011, 2014Zubek 2015). Second, executive institutions, such as cabinet hierarchies and dispute resolution mechanisms (e.g., coalition or cabinet committees), also solve intra-coalition conflicts over policy making (Bowler et al 2016;Falcó-Gimeno 2014;Greene & Jensen 2016;Indridason & Kristinsson 2013;Lipsmeyer & Pierce 2011;Martin & Vanberg 2011;Thies 2001).…”

Section: Coalitions and Political Institutions In Eu Policy Makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representing the compromise: How institutions serve government support coalitions in European Union policy making

Franchino

Wratil

2019

European J Political Res

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This article presents an original model of policy making by multiparty coalitions at the international level. Specifically, it analyses how domestic institutions serve parties in enforcing policy compromises onto national ministers negotiating legislation in the European Union (EU). In contrast to existing research on coalition politics, the model accounts for the benefits of not only legislative but also executive institutions and incorporates opposition parties as pivotal actors under minority governments. Ministers propose policy positions at the EU level that represent domestic coalition compromises when cabinet participation, executive coordination and parliamentary oversight of EU affairs make it cheap for coalition partners to challenge the minister's position and when ideological divisiveness increases the incentive to do so. Statistical analyses of 1,694 policy positions taken by ministers from 22 member states in the Council of the EU provide strong empirical evidence for the model. The results support the claim of executive dominance in EU policy making but also highlight that, where institutions are strong, ministers represent domestic coalition compromises rather than their own positions.

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Section: Coalitions and Political Institutions In Eu Policy Makingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representing the compromise: How institutions serve government support coalitions in European Union policy making

Franchino

Wratil

2019

European J Political Res

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“…This is a prominent argument in canonical theories of legislative organization Krehbiel 1987, 1990;Krehbiel 1991), yet this literature is grounded exclusively in the study of the two-party US Congress. There are very few microlevel studies of how committee appointment affects individual behavior in either multiparty parliamentary systems or democratizing regimes (Jones, Saiegh, and Spiller 2002;Krehbiel 1991;Zubek 2015). Thus, we extend the logic behind this theory to analyze institutional features in the French parliamentary context, to test whether committee service incentivized the acquisition of expertise and whether this translated into an increased probability of obtaining higher office in a deputy's career.…”

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confidence: 94%

Cabinets, Committees, and Careers: The Causal Effect of Committee Service

Cirone¹,

Coppenolle²

2018

The Journal of Politics

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What is the value of committee service to an individual legislator? Self-selection and party control of appointments typically obscure this relationship. We estimate the causal effect of committee service on legislative behavior and parliamentary careers by exploiting a natural experiment in the French Third Republic (1870-1940). Yearly lotteries divided the legislature into groups that nominated members to the budget committee, and we use the random composition of these groups as an instrument for individual appointment. We find that appointment increased legislative entrepreneurship concerning budget legislation but not other types, suggesting that committee members acquire specialized expertise. Committee service also led to ministerial appointment but not to higher office that does not require specific policy expertise, such as party or senatorial positions. Finally, we discuss alternative mechanisms, including reputation effects, political networks, and distributional targeting via pork barrel legislation.

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“…Across legislatures, it is possible to observe large variation in how committee systems are established. Some committee systems have extensive drafting authority and agenda control (comparative studies of formal institutional characteristics include André, Depauw, and Martin, 2016;Martin, 2011;Strøm, 1998;Yläoutinen and Hallerberg, 2008;Zubek, 2015). A strong committee system is typically seen as a necessary if not sufficient condition for the legislature to operate effectively in terms of influencing the legislative process and holding the executive to account (Strøm, 1990).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The articles in this section of Parliamentary Affairs study committee assignments in (mostly) European parliaments. This will provide new contributions to the debate on the suitability of US-originating theories outside of their 'home turf' (Martin 2018;Zubek 2015) and can help us to solve the disjunction between 'European' and 'American' experiences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes and Consequences

Martin

Mickler

2018

Parliamentary Affairs

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Conventional wisdom suggests that a strong legislature is built on a strong internal committee system, both in terms of committee powers and the willingness of members to engage in committee work. Committee assignments are the behavioural manifestation of legislative organisation. Despite this, much remains unknown about how committee assignments happen and with what causes and consequences. Our focus in this article is on providing the context for, and introducing new research on, what we call the political economy of committee assignments-which members get selected to sit on which committees, why, and with what consequences.

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Coalition Government and Committee Power

Cited by 23 publications

References 11 publications

Representing the compromise: How institutions serve government support coalitions in European Union policy making

Representing the compromise: How institutions serve government support coalitions in European Union policy making

Cabinets, Committees, and Careers: The Causal Effect of Committee Service

Committee Assignments: Theories, Causes and Consequences

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