Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game

Shinohara, Ryusuke

doi:10.1007/s00182-010-0244-8

Cited by 20 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Distributed decision and parallel computation algorithms were studied and developed in [28][29][30]. The field of cooperative control was started in earnest with the two seminal papers in 2003 [31] and 2004 [32].…”

Section: Cooperative Control Of Multi-agent Systems On Communication mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Control of Multi-Agent Systems

Lewis

Zhang

Hengster-Movrić

et al. 2014

Communications and Control Engineering

554

170

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Section: Cooperative Control Of Multi-agent Systems On Communication mentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative Control of Multi-Agent Systems

Lewis

Zhang

Hengster-Movrić

et al. 2014

Communications and Control Engineering

554

170

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…In such situations, the definition of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Shinohara, 2010) may also hold, that is, no set of agents has an incentive to break away from the Nash equilibrium and seek a new Nash solution among them. To guarantee that all agents in a graph are involved in the same game, the stronger definition of interactive Nash equilibrium is introduced here (Vamvoudakis et al, 2012).…”

Section: Interactive Nash Equilibriummentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-agent discrete-time graphical games and reinforcement learning solutions

et al. 2014

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“…In addition to coalition formation, the topic of coalition stability has been well explored in the existing literature. The literature provides various notions of stability, e.g., strong Nash equilibrium, coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, cooperative stability (see Shaffer [1995], Thoron [1998], Shinohara [2010]). Nevertheless, the notion introduced by D'Aspremont et al [1983] has been quite popular.…”

Section: Complete Versus Partial Collusion In Competing Coalitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions

Palsule-Desai

2015

Int. Game Theory Rev.

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In this paper, we develop a non-cooperative game theoretic model for our problem context in which the competing producers adopt one of the two alternate production and marketing technologies -efficient and inefficient. We examine stability related implications of the producers' decisions regarding the choices of (i) technologies, (ii) coalition formation, (iii) coalition form, (iv) intensity of collusion. The coalitions can adopt either complete collusion or partial collusion by determining intensity of collusion using endogenously determined sharing rules. The motivation for our study comes from the Costa Rican coffee industry and interesting findings presented in the existing literature focusing on a variety of competing-coalitions settings. Our results can be categorized as: (i) Nash equilibrium of the endogenously determined sharing rules, (ii) the equilibrium coalition forms, and (iii) stability of coalitions. They highlight the dynamics between the number of coalition producers and the cost of inefficiency. We show that the equilibrium sharing rules may have interior solutions and they are not necessarily (a)symmetric. We also show that both coalitions forming complete collusion of the respective producers in not always a Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium coalition forms need not be (a)symmetric. Our main contribution to existing literature rests in determining the situations in which (i) competing players form coalitions, and (ii) they adopt the coalition form of either complete or partial collusion. Moreover, we provide an alternate explanation to why competing producers horizontally merge in the presence of a competing coalition adopting partial collusion in spite of the merger paradox. We also show that none of the two types of producers considered in this paper have any incentives in not making the information on their coalition form public. Moreover, we establish that situations yielding stable coalitions always exist. Our results demonstrate that the cost advantage to the efficient producers decreases in the number of producers adopting the efficient technology, and the coalition stability related conditions need not imply better profitability for one type of producer vis-à-vis the other. Our model essentially provides a platform for future research in a variety of competing-coalitions settings adopting endogenously determined sharing rules.

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Coalition-proof equilibria in a voluntary participation game

Cited by 20 publications

References 14 publications

Cooperative Control of Multi-Agent Systems

Cooperative Control of Multi-Agent Systems

Multi-agent discrete-time graphical games and reinforcement learning solutions

Complete Versus Partial Collusion in Competing Coalitions

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