Coalition-proofness under weak and strong Pareto dominance

Coalition-proofness in a class of games with strategic substitutes

“…4. 4 See, e.g., Examples 1 and 2 inQuartieri (2013). See also Example 1 inKonishi et al (1999); however, note that inKonishi et al (1999) the terminology seemingly reverses the terminology of the present article.…”

“…The following known result is only a straightforward and very particular consequence of Theorem 1 in Quartieri (2013), which is much more general in its original. The similarities and dissimilarities with Corollaries 1 and 2 (and with Theorems 2 and 3) are evident.…”

“…2.4, if one additionally assumes that each interaction function σ i is also continuous then the games examined in this article are generalized quasi-aggregative games in the precise 1 See Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1996) and Quartieri (2013). In particular, for results concerning the coalition-proofness of Nash equilibria-in the sense of Bernheim et al (1987)-see Theorem A2 and its subsequent remark in Milgrom and Roberts (1996) and Theorems 1 and 2 and their respective Corollaries in Quartieri (2013). An appropriate discussion can be found in the last-mentioned article.…”