Coalition-safe equilibria with virtual payoffs

Kiayias, Aggelos; Stouka, Aikaterini-Panagiota

doi:10.1145/3479722.3480795

Cited by 8 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 47 publications

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“…We explored at some length game theoretic aspects of pooling behavior and proved that a centralized equilibrium can be a strong Nash equilibrium for a wide variety of reward and cost functions. This result is in the same spirit but more general than previous negative results presented in [1,23,24] as it does not rely on the distribution of resources across owners, or a specific "economies of scale" assumption that dictates a superlinear relation between rewards and costs, or the specific reward scheme used in Bitcoin, respectively.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 64%

Decentralizing Information Technology: The Advent of Resource Based Systems

Kiayias¹

2021

Preprint

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The growth of the Bitcoin network during the first decade of its operation to a global scale system is a singular event in the deployment of Information Technology systems. Can this approach serve as a wider paradigm for Information Technology services beyond the use case of digital currencies? We investigate this question by introducing the concept of resource based systems and their four fundamental characteristics: (i) resource-based operation, (ii) tokenomics, (iii) decentralized service provision, and (iv) rewards sharing. We explore these characteristics, identify design goals and challenges and investigate some crucial game theoretic aspects of reward sharing that can be decisive for their effective operation.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 64%