Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation

Gomes, Armando

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2022.01.010

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In further related literature, Gerber (2000) interpreted a general nontransferable utility game as a collection of pure bargaining games that can be played by individual coalitions and developed a solution concept that predicts which coalitions are formed and how the payoffs are distributed. Similarly, Gomes (2022) proposed a new solution for coalition bargaining among n players. For any coalition, there is a fixed probability that it will form and known payoffs for the players if it does.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Forming Coalitions in Normal-Form Games

Dwobeng¹,

Corley²

2022

TEL

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For a given n-person normal-form game G, we consider all possible sets of mutually exclusive and collective exhaustive coalitions of the n players. For each such set of coalitions, we define a coalitional semi-cooperative game Γ of G as one in which 1) the coalitions are taken as the players of this new game, 2) each coalition tries to maximize the sum of its individual players' payoffs, and 3) the players within a coalition cooperate to do so. The purpose of this paper is to determine an optimal set of coalitions for G for some relevant notion of optimality. To do so, for the payoff matrix of each possible Γ of G, we determine all Greedy Scalar Equilibria (GSEs), where a GSE is an analog of the Nash equilibrium but always exists in pure strategies. For each of these GSEs, we divide the total payoff for each coalition among its members in the same proportions as its members average over the entire payoff matrix of G. Doing so gives n modified individual player payoffs associated with each GSE of all the Γs. For each of these GSEs, we then compute the geometric mean of its n modified payoffs. A set of coalitions associated with a GSE is deemed optimal for G if the corresponding geometric mean is a maximum among all the GSEs for all the Γs. An optimal set of coalitions thus incorporates the selfishness of the coalitions via the GSE, while the geometric mean of the redistribution of the players' payoffs models the cooperation of and the fairness for the individual players.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Forming Coalitions in Normal-Form Games

Dwobeng¹,

Corley²

2022

TEL

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“…Recently there has been renewed interest in models where negotiations to form a coalition can break down, resulting in bargaining returning to the starting point (see[30,56]). These models have not been extended to partition function games.…”

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Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities

Montero

2022

Dyn Games Appl

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This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay if any set of coalitions profits from merging. Even under this strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in the absence of externalities, and symmetric players are not necessarily treated symmetrically in equilibrium. If the grand coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that assigns to each coalition its equilibrium payoff. Compared with the rule of order process of Ray and Vohra (Games Econ Behav 26:286–336, 1999), the bargaining procedure with random proposers tends to give a large advantage to the proposer, whereas the bargaining procedure with a rule of order tends to favor the responders. The equilibria of the two procedures cannot be ranked in general in terms of efficiency.

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Theorie und Empirie der Vergleichenden Koalitionsforschung: Stand und Ausblick

Bräuninger,

Debus

2024

Z Politikwiss

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ZusammenfassungDas Regieren in Mehrparteienkabinetten hat sich zum Normalfall in modernen Demokratien entwickelt. Daher verwundert es nicht, dass die Analyse des Prozesses der Bildung, des Regierens in und der Beendigung von Koalitionsregierungen zu einem Schwerpunkt der Vergleichenden Politikwissenschaft geworden ist. Wir legen in diesem Literature Review den Stand der Forschung zu Koalitionsregierungen dar, indem wir die jüngere Entwicklung in der Koalitionstheorie betrachten, um anschließend die Erkenntnisse insbesondere in den Bereichen der Analyse von Koalitionen zu beleuchten, die in den letzten Jahren deutlich an Beachtung gewonnen haben. Dazu zählen die Auswirkungen der institutionellen Merkmale politischer Systeme, etwa das Bestehen und die Ausgestaltung von Mehrebenenstrukturen oder die Kompetenzen von Parlamenten insbesondere im Kontext der Investitur einer neuen Regierung, sowie die Perzeption des Regierens in Koalitionen durch die Wähler und die Analyse der Koalitionsverhandlungsdauer und der Koalitionsabkommen. Abschließend diskutieren wir Ansätze für Fragestellungen, die vielversprechend für die weitere Entwicklung der wissenschaftlichen Analyse von Koalitionsregierungen sein können, insbesondere aufgrund der massiven Fortschritte im Bereich der quantitativen Daten- und Textanalyse.

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Coalitional bargaining games: A new concept of value and coalition formation

Cited by 5 publications

References 34 publications

Forming Coalitions in Normal-Form Games

Forming Coalitions in Normal-Form Games

Coalition Formation in Games with Externalities

Theorie und Empirie der Vergleichenden Koalitionsforschung: Stand und Ausblick

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