Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems

Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina

doi:10.1007/s00355-003-0259-1

Cited by 104 publications

(50 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…There is some interesting literature in the design of GSP mechanisms for assignment problems of heterogeneous goods when money is not available (Ehlers[2002], Ehlers et al[2003], Papai [2000Papai [ , 2001 and Svensson et al[2002]). Unfortunately, this literature usually charac-terizes mechanisms with poor equity properties (e.g.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Juárez

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

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Summary. Every agent reports his willingness to pay for one unit of good. A mechanism allocates goods and cost shares to some agents. We characterize the group strategyproof (GSP ) mechanisms under two alternative continuity conditions interpreted as tie-breaking rules. With the maximalist rule (M AX) an indifferent agent is always served. With the minimalist rule (M IN ) an indifferent agent does not get a unit of good.GSP and M AX characterize the cross-monotonic mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever symmetry is required. On the other hand, GSP and M IN characterize the sequential mechanisms. These mechanisms are appropriate whenever there is scarcity of the good.Our results are independent of an underlying cost function; they unify and strengthen earlier results for particular classes of cost functions.

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Juárez

2013

Games and Economic Behavior

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“…Allowing for general preferences over sets of objects, Papai (2001) shows that sequential dictatorships are the only deterministic mechanisms that are nonbossy, strategy-proof and Pareto optimal. Ehlers and Klaus (2003) assume separable preferences across objects and show that the sequential dictatorships are the only deterministic mechanisms that are coalition-proof and Pareto optimal. Our impossibility result demonstrates that assignment of multiple objects is difficult even if one allows for random assignment.…”

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confidence: 99%

Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects

Kojima

2009

Mathematical Social Sciences

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Abstract. We consider random assignment of multiple indivisible objects. When each agent receives one object, Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) show that the probabilistic serial mechanism is ordinally efficient, envy-free and weakly strategy-proof. When each agent receives more than one object, we propose a generalized probabilistic serial mechanism that is ordinally efficient and envy-free but not weakly strategy-proof. Our main result shows that, if each agent receives more than one object, there exists no mechanism that is ordinally efficient, envy-free and weakly strategy-proof. JEL Classification Numbers: C70, D61, D63.

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“…6 Formally, De…nition 4 A …rm f 's preference relation P (f ) satis…es separability if for all S W and w = 2 S we have that (S [ fwg) P (f )S if and only if fwgP (f );:…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model

Martínez

Massó

Neme

et al. 2010

Journal of Mathematical Economics

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The Blocking Lemma identi…es a particular blocking pair for each nonstable and individually rational matching that is preferred by some agents of one side of the market to their optimal stable matching. Its interest lies in the fact that it has been an instrumental result to prove key results on matching. For instance, the fact that in the college admissions problem the workers-optimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers and the strong stability theorem in the marriage model follow directly from the Blocking Lemma. However, it is known that the Blocking Lemma and its consequences do not hold in the general many-to-one matching model in which …rms have substitutable preference relations. We show that the Blocking Lemma holds for the many-to-one matching model in which …rms'preference relations are, in addition to substitutable, quota q separable. We also show that the Blocking Lemma holds on a subset of substitutable preference pro…les if and only if the workersoptimal stable mechanism is group strategy-proof for the workers on this subset of pro…les.We are grateful to Flip Klijn, Howard Petith, William Thomson, an associate editor, and two referees for very helpful comments. The work of R. Martínez, A. Neme, and J.

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Coalitional strategy-proof and resource-monotonic solutions for multiple assignment problems

Cited by 104 publications

References 24 publications

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

Random assignment of multiple indivisible objects

The Blocking Lemma for a many-to-one matching model

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