2016
DOI: 10.3386/w21903
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Coasean Bargaining to Address Environmental Externalities

Abstract: , and Lauren Steely. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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Cited by 12 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Property law creates a bundle of rights which property owners are free to exercise and which protect them from interference, and, while subject to transaction costs, voluntary exchange allocates property to those who value it most (Cooter and Ulen 2014). Elaborating on the canonical 1960 article 'The Problem of Social Cost' by Ronald Coase, Libecap (2016) demonstrates in detail that, if property rights are not defined, the number of claimants could be unlimited, rents dissipated, and trade becomes impossible. The greater the benefits from establishing property rights or the greater the losses from their absence, the higher the transaction costs.…”
Section: Property Rights and Contracts As Fundamental Building Blocksmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Property law creates a bundle of rights which property owners are free to exercise and which protect them from interference, and, while subject to transaction costs, voluntary exchange allocates property to those who value it most (Cooter and Ulen 2014). Elaborating on the canonical 1960 article 'The Problem of Social Cost' by Ronald Coase, Libecap (2016) demonstrates in detail that, if property rights are not defined, the number of claimants could be unlimited, rents dissipated, and trade becomes impossible. The greater the benefits from establishing property rights or the greater the losses from their absence, the higher the transaction costs.…”
Section: Property Rights and Contracts As Fundamental Building Blocksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the context of natural capital, however, the assignment of property rights may not always be feasible, or their exercise may not always be beneficial. Libecap (2016) asserts that the transaction costs of Coasean exchange tend to be high for 'very broad-scale environmental externalities'. Given that mitigation values or costs vary within or across countries, long-term benefits or costs are different or uncertain under international environmental agreements.…”
Section: Property Rights and Contracts As Fundamental Building Blocksmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The underlying arguments for retention by the state were not fundamentally due to an inability to define property rights effectively (Libecap, 1981;Libecap, 2007). The key problem for state regulation or ownership in either of these cases is that neither politicians nor bureaucrats are full residual claimants to the benefits and costs of their actions in the way that private owners are, so that incentives and outcomes differ, often creating other, and perhaps costlier, externalities (Libecap, 2016).…”
Section: The Economic Institutions Of Property Rightsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The underlying arguments for retention by the state were not fundamentally due to an inability to define property rights effectively (Libecap, 1981;Libecap, 2007). The key problem for state regulation or ownership in either of these cases is that neither politicians nor bureaucrats are full residual claimants to the benefits and costs of their actions in the way that private owners are, so that incentives and outcomes differ, often creating other, and perhaps costlier, externalities (Libecap, 2016).…”
Section: The Economic Institutions Of Property Rightsmentioning
confidence: 99%