Codes of Conduct and Standard Setting in the Forest Sector

Abstract

In an age of globalization, there is a growing perception that state regulatory instruments may be an inadequate means of regulating firm conduct. Increasingly, scholars are evaluating how corporate codes of conduct may operate as regulatory mechanisms. This article examines competing codes of conduct in the forest sector. Through a detailed case study of code adoption, innovation, and diffusion in the forest sector, focusing on mechanisms of vertical, horizontal and competitive diffusion, it is found that non-governmental organization (NGO) codes have placed competitive pressure to adopt higher standards on competing schemes. However, NGO schemes have been limited in constructing fluid markets for their own goods. The article examines which strategies for codes regimes are most likely to diffuse high standards throughout contemporary markets.

Forest certification and democracy

“…Yet over time, industry-based certification programs were drawn into competition with the FSC (e.g., Cashore et al 2003, Overdevest 2004. They adopted stakeholder systems for standard setting and review, public notice and comment processes for decisionmaking, third party certification, and also a growing number of substantive requirements Overdevest 2004). Most industry-based certification programs are now federated into the PEFC, which recently defined itself as a global alliance and changed its name from ''Pan European Forest Certification'' to ''Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification''.…”

“…This approach gives individual companies primacy in defining standards, and in its most basic form requires only that they have functioning environmental management systems, regardless of their substantive performance. Yet over time, industry-based certification programs were drawn into competition with the FSC (e.g., Cashore et al 2003, Overdevest 2004. They adopted stakeholder systems for standard setting and review, public notice and comment processes for decisionmaking, third party certification, and also a growing number of substantive requirements Overdevest 2004).…”

“…This article builds on the growing body of empirical research placing such programs in their larger organizational fields 1 (e.g., Abbott and Snidal 2009a, b;Bartley 2003Bartley , 2007Bartley and Smith 2010;Cashore et al 2003Cashore et al , 2004Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009;Elliott 2000;Meidinger 1999Meidinger , 2000Meidinger , 2003Meidinger , 2006Meidinger , 2007Meidinger , 2008Overdevest 2004Overdevest , 2010 and considers democratic legitimacy in terms of broader regulatory systems containing multiple programs. 2 Instead of adopting the conventional assumption that competition among programs is a form of dysfunctional fragmentation leading to confusion and ineffectiveness, it explores the possibility that interprogram competition may lead to more democratically legitimate standards and institutions.…”

L’ingérence socialement responsable dans les relations interorganisationnelles

“…Au regard de la capacité des entreprises transnationales à passer outre la législation sociale nationale dans certains pays (Dubin, 2004), les ACI et les CC peuvent constituer un véritable progrès pour les salariés des receveurs d'ordre placés dans une position de subordination fonctionnelle (notamment ceux implantés dans les pays émergents). Face à des droits étatiques nationaux lacunaires, ils peuvent permettre d'améliorer les conditions sociales entourant la relation d'emploi (Sobczak, 2002a ;Overdevest, 2004). Le droit continuant à considérer o 2 les entreprises d'un réseau économique comme des entités juridiquement autonomes, ces outils de régulation permettent en fait d'éviter une rupture trop marquée du lien entre le pouvoir économique d'une société pivot et la responsabilité associée aux conséquences sociales de son activité au sein de son réseau de partenaires (Sobczak, 2002a).…”

Beyond Westphalia: Competitive Legalization in Emerging Transnational Regulatory Systems

“…Thus, the categories and language of standards have converged in numerous ways. While much of this change has involved gradual 'ratcheting up' (Fung et al 2001, Overdevest 2004) by PEFC members of their environmental standards and occasional addition of social ones, a certain amount has also involved concessions by the FSC to make its program more workable in the face of market challenges. A good example is the adoption of the 'percentage claims' policy discussed above.…”