It is pr oposed that the cognitive system imposes patter ns on the world according to a simplicity principle: Choose the patter n that provides the briefest representation of the available infor m ation. T he simplicity principle is nor matively justi® edÐ patter ns that suppor t simple representations provide good explanations and predictions on the basis of wh ich the agent can make decisions and actions. M or eover, the simplicity principle appears to be consistent with empirical data from many psychological domains, including perception, similarity, lear ning, m em or y, and reasoning. T hus, the simplicity principle promises to ser ve as the star ting point for the rational analysis of a wide range of cognitive processes, in An derson 's (1990, 1991a) sense. T he simplicity principle also provides a framework for integrating a wide range of existing psychological proposals.T he cognitive system must cope with a world that is imm ensely complex bu t that is, non etheless, highly patter ned. T he patter ns are crucial. In a completely random world, prediction, explanation, and understand ing wou ld be im possibleÐ there wou ld be n o patter ns on wh ich p rediction could be based, to wh ich explanations could refer, or the comprehension of wh ich could amou nt to und erstandin g. Even mor e fundamentally, withou t any patter ns relating actions to consequences, there would be no basis to ch oose on e action r ather than another.T he ability to ® nd patter ns in the world is therefore of central impor tance throu gh ou t cogn ition . W ith ou t the ability to ® nd such patter ns an agent m ight as well be in a random world: It would be able to predict, explain, an d u nder stand nothing; and it would have no basis on wh ich to choose its actions. By contrast, the cognitive systems of people an d
T H E QUART ERLY JOU RN AL O F EXPERIM EN T AL PS YCH OL OG Y, 1999, 52A (2), 273±302Requests for repr ints and cor respondence concer nin g this article sh ould be sent to N ick Chater, D epartment of Psychology, U niver sity of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL , U.K . E-mail: nick.chater @warwick.ac.uk I would like to thank Fr ans Boselie, M ark Ellison, St even F inch, U lrike H ahn, Peter van der H elm, Emmanuel L eeuwenberg, James M cClelland, M ike Oaksford, M artin Pickering, Emmanuel Pothos, M artin Red ington, Jer ry S eligman, D avid Sh anks, Julian Sm ith , and Paul Vita nyi for valuable d iscussions of these ideas at various st ages in their development or for comments on this manuscript. A brief and infor mal outline of some of the mater ial her e is given in an article for The Psychologist (Chater, 1997).T his paper is based on an EPS P rize L ectur e (for distinguished work in experimental p sychology or a cogn ate discipline by a person at an early stage of her or his career ), deliver ed at the M arch 1997 EP S meeting at Oxford U niver sity.q 1999 T he Exp erimental Psychology S ociety