Coerced Confusion? Local Emergency Policy Implementation After September 11

Abstract

This study examines what motivates local emergency management officials to implement federal emergency management and homeland security policies within their own departments since the September 11 attacks. Pre-existing research claims there is confusion among local governments about potential changes to the role local emergency management services play before, during, and after natural, accidental, or terror related incidents. Meanwhile, additional research claims the federal disaster management policies (The National Response Plan, National Incident Management System, and Incident Command System) lack flexibility in implementation expectations, and there is limited cohesion among the layers of government, actors, and interests involved. This study asserts that something must spur local actors to comply with federal policy demands in their daily operations given how the post-September 11 policies change the field. The study specifically examines the effects of coercion, defined as actions taken by the federal government to force state and local implementers to comply with federal policy demands. Available federal grant dollars for emergency management and homeland security practices could make a dramatic difference to local emergency management operations, forcing these actors to comply with federal policy demands, even if it is in a begrudging fashion that deviates from traditional Comprehensive Emergency Management (CEM) principles.

Representative Bureaucracy in Emergency Management: Attitudes About Contemporary Emergency Management Policy and Politics in Local Agencies

“…In total 3554 valid e-mail addresses were found and distributed the survey, from which 775 (21.8%) responded, covering all 50 states. This response rate is very similar to a previous study by Hildebrand (2015Hildebrand ( , 2017Hildebrand ( , 2019, where the survey garnered 540 responses from 2422 (22.3%) in the sample pool of similar recipients but representing only 48 states during the summer of 2008. Additional nationwide web-based surveys in the emergency management field performed by Weaver et al (2014) and Wernstedt et al (2019) had similar response rates amongst local emergency management professionals at 30.3 and 17.1% respectively.…”

“…Even though there seemed to be disappointment against the Obama administration amongst the local officials, it was not limited in Republican districts to just his administration. The results demonstrate a level of disconnect between the federal desires of both administrations and the desire of local actors to retain local control in emergency situations in a manner similar to that expressed in previous research (Birkland and Waterman 2008;Chang 2017;Edwards 2007;Esinger 2004;Haddow 2005;Hildebrand 2015;Hill and Hupe 2003;Jensen 2011;Jensen and Waugh 2014;Jensen and Youngs 2014;Lester and Krejci 2007;McEntire 2004;Newmann 2002;Nicholson 2007;Scavo, Kearney, and Kilroy 2008;Schneider 2005;Takeda and Helms 2006;Waugh 2006;Wise 2002). This suggests that the idea of local flexibility that the federal policies have on paper may have some fans, but the changes since the September 11 attacks still have many detractors, and they cross partisan lines in the jurisdictions they represent when expressing their dissatisfaction with the direction from the federal level.…”

“…Emergency management is of many policy areas where federalism continues to be tested, especially on the cooperative end. Since previous research suggested coercion in the field had limitations (Hildebrand 2015), and that local actors may act opportunistically when dealing with the federal level (Birkland and Waterman 2008;Hildebrand 2017;Neal and Webb 2006), the findings herein lay another foundational piece explaining why the command-and-control nature of the policies set forth after the September 11 attacks are not universally supported or implemented in the field. Local actors find reason enough to turn their back on the federal policy demands, they do so, and seem to mirror the partisan attitudes of their jurisdictions when they due to some degree.…”

COVID-19 and Local Emergency Management Operations

“…Jensen and Youngs (2014) examine the implementation of the National Incident Management System (NIMS) at the county level. Hildebrand (2015;2017;2019) considered the opinions of local emergency management officials regarding federal policy demands that emanated after the September 11 attacks, such as NIMS, the National Response Plan (NRP) and its replacement policy the National Response Framework (NRF), as well as the Incident Command System (ICS). None of this work examines any impacts on the size of the county or the location (urban/rural/suburban) of the county or municipality specifically.…”

Is there coercion in local emergency management policy implementation?

“…Research has shown that the federal government, while attempting to take the lead role during emergency situations, has been somewhat lax regarding the degree of enforcement of the federal policy and grant expectations (Jensen 2009 , 2010 , 2011 ; Hildebrand 2015 ). But, disagreement exists regarding federal policy expectations in this field.…”