Coercion promotes alloparental care in cooperative breeders

Abstract

Members of social groups may negotiate among each other about the exchange of goods and services. If this involves asymmetries between interacting partners, for instance in condition, power, or expected payoffs, coercion may be involved in the bargain. Cooperative breeders are excellent models to study such interactions, because asymmetries are inherent in the relationship between dominant breeders and subordinate helpers. Currently it is unclear whether punishment is used to enforce costly cooperation in such systems. Here we investigated experimentally in the cooperatively breeding cichlid Neolamprologus pulcher whether alloparental brood care provided by subordinates is contingent on enforcement by dominant breeders. We manipulated first the brood care behavior of a subordinate group member and then the possibility of the dominant breeders to punish idle helpers. When subordinates were prevented from providing brood care, breeders increased their attacks on them, which triggered increased alloparental brood care by helpers as soon as this was again possible. In contrast, when the possibility to punish helpers was prevented, energetically costly alloparental brood care did not increase. Our results confirm predictions of the pay-to-stay mechanism causing alloparental care in this species and they suggest more generally that coercion can play an important role in the control of cooperation.

Nepotism mediates enforced cooperation in asymmetric negotiations

“…They are only tolerated when needed, 50 , 107 and if their contribution falls short of demand they are punished through breeder attacks, 56 which elicits enhanced helping levels. 48 , 49 , 54 , 57 Our results show that their own offspring are not exempt from paying for tolerance, but obviously they benefit from price deduction.…”

“… 13 , 14 , 45 , 46 , 47 , 48 , 49 Subordinates may hence pay to stay within the territory of dominants, which represents one cause for alloparental care in cooperatively breeding animals. 7 , 50 , 51 , 52 , 53 , 54 , 55 , 56 , 57 , 58 , 59 …”

Status-dependent metabolic effects of social interactions in a group-living fish

“…Thus, the ability of subordinates to mount and recover from a stress response was impaired in the presence of a dominant fish. In social groups, subordinate N. pulcher perform submissive behaviours [ 44 ] and provide allocare for the offspring of the dominant breeding pair [ 45 ]—while also suppressing their own reproductive output [ 46 ]—as these actions reduce aggression received from dominants. The performance of these behaviours (e.g.…”

Male Barbary macaques choose loyal coalition partners which may increase their coalition network betweenness

“…Being the target of a male coalition can cause injury, loss of resource access, or loss of status (van Schaik et al, 2004, 2006). Avoiding such costs imposed by others is a major adaptive problem (McCullough et al, 2013), and yet reciprocal partner choice based on harm avoidance has received little attention except for studies on punishment as a mechanism maintaining cooperation (Clutton‐Brock & Parker, 1995; Zöttl et al, 2023). Even as an ally, males are at risk to pay significant costs, and engaging as an ally in rank‐changing coalitions (van Schaik et al, 2006; Watts, 2010) is particularly risky.…”