Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization

Albertus, Michael; Menaldo, Victor

doi:10.5129/001041512798838003

Cited by 109 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Thus, our study contributes to the discussion on the effects of repression. Studying the MENA region, we can corroborate the argument that repression suppresses political violence (Albertus and Menaldo ) – if repression is used moderately and discriminately. We can also corroborate the argument that repression generates political violence (Sullivan ) – if repression is widespread and used indiscriminately.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 67%

Repression as a Double‐edged Sword: Resilient Monarchs, Repression and Revolution in the Arab World

Bischof

Fink

2015

Swiss Political Sci Review

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The Arab world shows a puzzling variation of political violence. The region's monarchies often remain quiet, while other autocracies witness major upheaval. Institutional explanations of this variation suggest that monarchical rule solves the ruler's credible commitment problems and prevents elite splits. This article argues that institutional explanations neglect the role of repression: increasing the scope of repression raises the costs of rebellion and deters rebels. However, the deterrence effect disappears if repression is used indiscriminately. If remaining peaceful offers no benefits, repression creates new rebels instead of deterring them. A time‐series‐cross‐section analysis of repression and political violence in the Middle East and North Africa corroborates our argument and shows the u‐curve relation between repression and violence. Once we control for repression, monarchies have no special effect anymore. Thus, our article addresses the discussion about monarchical exceptionalism, and offers an explanation why repression deters as well as incites political violence.

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Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 67%

Repression as a Double‐edged Sword: Resilient Monarchs, Repression and Revolution in the Arab World

Bischof

Fink

2015

Swiss Political Sci Review

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“…To achieve this goal, authoritarian leaders do not only control the selection of the elite corps but also their fate. Despite recent scholarship on authoritarianism tends to focus on government repression against the masses (see, e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006;Albertus and Menaldo 2012), attention to repression against…”

Section: Purges and Coup Onsetmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elite Co-optation, Repression, and Coups in Autocracies

Bove

Rivera

2015

International Interactions

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This article provides an explanation for the significant variation in coups in autocracies. The existing theoretical literature focuses on the strategies that leaders' use to thwart mass mobilization and survive in power. However, most autocratic leaders lose power through a coup, indicating that the main threats to political survival in autocracies emerge from insiders and not from outsiders the incumbent coalition. This article focuses on leaders' strategies to mitigate elite threats and argues that autocrats' strategies of co-optation and repression within the ruling elite and the armed forces affect the risk of coups in opposite ways. Elected authoritarian legislatures are instruments that leaders employ to co-opt members of the incumbent coalition and are expected to decrease the likelihood of coups. In contrast, purges of insider actors constitute a repressive strategy that depletes bases of support and increases the risk of coups. We find empirical support for these hypotheses from a sample of all authoritarian regimes from 1950 to 2004.

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“…2 By empowering their armed forces, however, authoritarian regimes run the risk that their militaries will challenge for political preeminence. 3 To protect themselves from military coups, authoritarian regimes throughout the world bolstered their rule by implementing a variety of "coup-proofing" strategies.…”

Section: Coup-proofing and The Arab Spring Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%