Coercive Diplomacy Meets Diversionary Incentives: The Impact of US and Iranian Domestic Politics during the Bush and Obama Presidencies1

Abstract

Davies GAM. (2011) Coercive Diplomacy Meets Diversionary Incentives: The Impact of US and Iranian Domestic Politics during the Bush and Obama Presidencies. Foreign Policy Analysis, doi: 10.1111/j.1743‐8594.2011.00164.x This paper applies theories of strategic conflict avoidance and diversionary war to help explain US–Iranian interactions. The article argues that US attempts at coercive diplomacy have tended to strengthen hardliners in Iran by allowing them to frame opposition to government policies as support for the United States. In particular, US public uncertainty about the advisability of using force against Iran provided both the Supreme Leader and the Iranian President with an opportunity to increase tensions with the United States with little concern about provoking a military strike. The aggressive stance of the Iranian regime is about developing a threat which diverts attention from domestic problems and places it firmly in the arena of the international.

Nuclear Diversion Theory and Legitimacy Crisis: The Case of Iran

“…The second qualification adds a reactive dimension to diversionary theory: the prospective target of diversionary measures might turn to SCA—mitigating tension so as to deprive its rival of its diversionary leverage. And while SCA is usually concerning the reaction of the weaker state to the stronger (Fordham ), it may work the other way around (Davies ).…”

“…Ascertaining diversion is no easy task, a difficulty well reflected in Davies's () consecutive, but inconsistent, observations regarding Iran's foreign policy. Drawing on quantitative analyses from 1990 to 2004, Davies (, 220) concludes that “the Iranians tend not to engage in diversionary hostility; rather they encapsulate their problems and avoid confrontation with the United States.” Later, based on a qualitative study of the years preceding the Iranian 2009 presidential election, Davies (, 313) submits that “the aggressive stance of the Iranian regime is about developing a threat which diverts attention from domestic problems.” This apparent scholarly inconsistency may well reflect empirical changes: the evolving domestic legitimacy crisis in Iran, which has further deepened in the election's aftermath, the period I focus on.…”

“…While all nuclear motivations—the four “usual suspects” as well as the fifth proposed here—lack conclusive evidence, there is sufficient reason to suspect that the legitimation motive has become increasingly weighty in this causal complex. A few recent studies have ascribed an important role to domestic politics in shaping Iranian foreign policy (Abedin ; Davies , ). However, the domestic factor's influence on Iranian nuclear policy is rarely analyzed, and even then it is often dismissed (Khan ).…”

R2P from below: Does the British public view humanitarian interventions as ethical and effective?

“…Public opinion in democratic states is one of the most transparent characteristics behind elite calculations affecting their willingness to intervene and pay the costs of foreign military adventures. Manifest public support for intervention signals to human-rights abusers that a powerful liberal democracy has a domestic incentive to intervene (Davies 2012). Conversely, a state whose citizens who are plainly predisposed against intervention will struggle to convince adversaries of its military resolve.…”

“…A coercive diplomatic strategy is an alluring alternative to war, as it provides many of the benefits without the costs and risks associated with military conflict. The two dimensions to a successful coercive diplomatic strategy are firstly, a state has to have the capability to inflict unacceptable costs on a target and secondly the threat of unacceptable costs has to be credible (Davies 2012). Credibility can often be garnered from interests, if the state clearly has strong interests in the region for geostrategic reasons then the threats are credible because they have either economic or security imperatives that need to be fulfilled.…”