Coevolutionary Network Model for Efficient Collaboration in Systems-of-Systems

Boyd, Myron; Mazzuchi, Thomas A.; Sarkani, Shahram

doi:10.1109/sose55472.2022.9812631

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Due to the tension between risk and reward of collaboration relative to an independent alternative, the Stag Hunt game captures key dynamics present in collaborative systems. 21 Examples of Stag Hunt games used to model collaborative systems in literature include: unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems with multi-vehicle path planning, 22 software engineering teams, 23 space resource harvesting, 24 and extended government enterprises such as food-born illness monitoring, levees, and storm evacuation. 25 In each case, a collaborative strategy leads to more effective solutions compared to an independent strategy but is susceptible to coordination failure.…”

Section: Game Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For this reason, the

(S,H)

outcome for actor i is called the “sucker's” payoff in literature 5 . In contrast, a game with harmony dynamics prefers the

(S,H)

outcome to

(H,H)

, removing all incentive from pursuing an independent strategy. Due to the tension between risk and reward of collaboration relative to an independent alternative, the Stag Hunt game captures key dynamics present in collaborative systems 21 . Examples of Stag Hunt games used to model collaborative systems in literature include: unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) systems with multi‐vehicle path planning, 22 software engineering teams, 23 space resource harvesting, 24 and extended government enterprises such as food‐born illness monitoring, levees, and storm evacuation 25 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Effects of differential risk attitudes in collaborative systems design

Avşar

Grogan

2023

Systems Engineering

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Collaboration enables multiple actors with different objectives to work together and achieve a goal beyond individual capabilities. However, strategic uncertainty from partners' actions introduces a potential for losses under failed collaboration relative to pursuing an independent system. The fundamental tradeoff between high‐value but uncertain outcomes from collaborative systems and lower‐value but more certain outcomes for independent systems induces a bistability strategic dynamic. Actors exhibit different risk attitudes that impact decisions under uncertainty which complicate shared understanding of collaborative dynamics. This paper investigates how risk attitudes affect design and strategy decisions in collaborative systems through the lens of game theory. First, an analytical model studies the effect of differential risk attitudes in a two‐actor problem with stag‐hunting strategic dynamics formulated as single‐ and bi‐level games. Next, a simulation model pairs actors with different risk attitudes in a 29‐game tournament based on a prior behavioral experiment. Results show that outcomes collaborative design problems change based on the risk attitudes of both actors. Results also emphasize that considering conservative lower‐level design options facilitates collaboration by providing risk‐averse actors with a safer solution. By accepting that decision‐making actors are not all risk‐neutral, future work seeks to develop new design methods to strengthen the adoption of efficient collaborative solutions.

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