“…It is reasonable to hypothesize that performance depends on the type of inference, with those requiring higher-level social reasoning or more complex linguistic structures to communicate the inference being more impaired. The literature on social cognition in DS supports this hypothesis, with several studies documenting early emerging social strengths (Fidler, 2006; Fidler, Most, Booth-LaForce, & Kelly, 2008; Moore, Oates, Hobson, & Goodwin, 2002), but deficits in higher-order social cognitive reasoning, such as theory of mind (Abbeduto et al, 2001; Zelazo, Burack, Benedetto, & Frye, 1996), interpreting others’ internal states (Beeghly & Cicchetti, 1997; Hesketh & Chapman, 1998), and understanding the intentions of others (Hahn, Fidler, Hepburn, & Rogers, 2013). It is likely, therefore, that these deficits will have an impact on, as well as be impacted by, at least some aspects of inference generation in DS (see Tager-Flusberg, 1992).…”