2008
DOI: 10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004
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Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment

Abstract: Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with… Show more

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Cited by 930 publications
(970 citation statements)
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References 34 publications
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“…Cognitive load, a manipulation often used to impair deliberative processing, has been applied in various different studies whose results can be explained with the RIM. Selfcontrol (e.g., Lattimore & Maxwell, 2004 ;Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993 ), processing of negated stimuli (Deutsch et al 2009 ), social judgments and attributions (Gilbert et al, 1988 ;Krull & Erickson, 1995 ;Trope & Alfi eri, 1997 ), moral judgments (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008 ), and general reasoning (De Neys, 2006 ) have all proven to be impaired by cognitive load in ways that are consistent with the RIM's predictions. The idea that working memory resources may also play a role in refl ective processing has been tested in several studies, both by comparing individuals with dispositionally high or low working memory capacities (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008 ;Thush et al, 2008 ) and by specifi cally taxing resources of working memory (Deutsch et al, 2009 ).…”
Section: Motivation and Opportunitysupporting
confidence: 64%
“…Cognitive load, a manipulation often used to impair deliberative processing, has been applied in various different studies whose results can be explained with the RIM. Selfcontrol (e.g., Lattimore & Maxwell, 2004 ;Wegner, Erber, & Zanakos, 1993 ), processing of negated stimuli (Deutsch et al 2009 ), social judgments and attributions (Gilbert et al, 1988 ;Krull & Erickson, 1995 ;Trope & Alfi eri, 1997 ), moral judgments (Greene, Morelli, Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008 ), and general reasoning (De Neys, 2006 ) have all proven to be impaired by cognitive load in ways that are consistent with the RIM's predictions. The idea that working memory resources may also play a role in refl ective processing has been tested in several studies, both by comparing individuals with dispositionally high or low working memory capacities (Hofmann, Gschwendner, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008 ;Thush et al, 2008 ) and by specifi cally taxing resources of working memory (Deutsch et al, 2009 ).…”
Section: Motivation and Opportunitysupporting
confidence: 64%
“…dishonesty ͉ fMRI ͉ honesty ͉ lie detection ͉ moral judgment R ecent research in moral psychology/neuroscience has focused on the respective roles of automatic and controlled processes in moral judgment (1,2), particularly in the context of hypothetical dilemmas involving life-and-death tradeoffs (''trolley problems'') (3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11). Comparably little is known about the cognitive processes that generate honest and dishonest behavior (12,13), and the neural bases of choices to behave honestly or dishonestly have, to our knowledge, never been studied specifically.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cognitive load refers to the load placed on working memory, and has been linked with ethical reasoning (Greene et al, 2008). Cognitive load presents a distraction which might impair an individual's ability to be attentive to their present experience.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%