Cognitive Paleoanthropology and Technology: Toward a Parsimonious Theory (PATH)

Abstract

Tool use in humans and hominins (i.e., extant relatives to humans) is unique in several respects. To date, no attempt has been made to review the main patterns of tool behavior specific to these species as well as to integrate them into a coherent framework. The aim here is to fill this gap by (a) identifying these behavioral specificities and (b) trying to explain the greatest number of these specificities with the lowest number of cognitive mechanisms. Based on this approach, this article provides a potential solution, namely, the PArsimonious THeory of hominin technology (PATH), aiming to account for the cognitive origins of 4 behavioral characteristics: transfer, complex tool use, secondary tool use, and tool saving. A key hypothesis is that the emergence of 2 breaking mechanisms—technical reasoning and semantic reasoning—could have boosted hominin technology. PATH offers an original framework for understanding the most archaic, human cognitive traits, thereby providing a good starting point for future investigation about the cognitive evolution of technology in the genus Homo.

Tools as “petrified memes”: A duality

“…However, as Hernik stresses, we did not elaborate on the opposite case, that is, where an individual has to infer the conventional function of an artifact (e.g., a hammer) she or he has never seen before (hereafter called teleofunctional inference). As a matter of fact, we have already discussed this aspect and corroborated Hernik's hypothesis that humans might solve teleofunctional inference situations by using a kind of "teleological reasoning" (see Osiurak 2017;Osiurak & Badets 2016;Osiurak et al 2008). In the case of reverse engineering, individuals know the function (i.e., the goal) of the tool in question.…”

The elephant in the room: What matters cognitively in cumulative technological culture

“…Being able to maintain multiple mechanical actions in memory for a period of time is cognitively different from being able to combine them into a purposeful chain of interdependent mechanical actions. Furthermore, working memory is not a cognitive mechanism that is used to generate content, but instead temporarily stores content that is processed by other cognitive mechanisms (see Osiurak 2017). Therefore, another hypothesis is that nonhumans might have difficulties understanding the physical principles underlying mechanical actions because of their lack of technical-reasoning skills.…”

New Caledonian crows afford invaluable comparative insights into human cumulative technological culture

“…However, human tool behavior differs from that known to occur in nonhumans in various respects (Osiurak 2017). For instance, unlike most tool-using species, we can use not only simple tools that amplify motor actions of the upper limbs (e.g., a stick to extend reach and a rock to increase pounding force), but also complex tools that transform our motor actions into qualitatively different mechanical actions (e.g., a knife to cut and a pencil to write; Frey 2007).…”