This experiment tested predictions derived from a social contingency model of judgment and choice that identifies 3 distinctive strategies that people rely on in dealing with demands for accountability from important interpersonal or institutional audiences. The model predicts that (a) when people know the views of the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they will rely on the low-effort acceptability heuristic and simply shift their views toward those of the prospective audience, (b) when people do not know the views of the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they will be motivated to think in relatively flexible, multidimensional ways (preemptive selfcriticism), and (c) when people are accountable for positions to which they feel committed, they will devote the majority of their mental effort to justifying those positions (defensive bolstering). The experiment yielded results supportive of these 3 predictions. The study also revealed some evidence of individual differences in social and cognitive strategies for coping with accountability.Many writers have criticized cognitive social psychology for its apparent indifference to the interpersonal and institutional settings within which people make judgments and choices (e.g., Gergen, 1982;Sampson, 1981). Although these critiques make important points, it is necessary to advance beyond metatheoretical position papers and to specify the particular ways in which interpersonal and institutional variables interact with cognitive tendencies of the perceiver to shape how people actually make up their minds.Recent research on accountability points to one possible answer. Tetlock (1985a) has argued that accountability is a universal feature of everyday decision-making environments. Accountability, from this standpoint, is a critical rule-and normenforcement mechanism: the social psychological link between individual thinkers on the one hand and the social systems to which they belong on the other. The fact that people are ultimately accountable for their decisions is an implicit or explicit constraint on virtually everything they do. Failure to behave in ways for which one can construct acceptable accounts leads to varying degrees of censure-depending, of course, on the gravity of the offense and the norms of the organization (Schlenker, 1982;Scott &Lyman, 1968;Tetlock, 198 la).A good deal of experimental evidence indicates that accountability pressures can affect both what people think (the beliefs and preferences they express) and how they think (the reasoning