The era of big data is here now, and spectrum resources are increasingly scarce in heterogeneous network environment. The spectrum efficiency and secure transmission of big data are important issues. Cognitive radio has been proposed to address the issue of spectrum efficiency, and is a hot topic in the literatures. In multi-hop cooperative cognitive radio networks (CCRNs), secondary users need the primary users' authorization to be relays. Most existing centralized route selection schemes ignore the energy allocation, and thus are inefficient. Moreover, the incomplete of information in multi-hop network leads to many difficulties in cooperation. Inspired by the game theory, a novel strategy is proposed in this paper to defend against insider attacks based on trust. This strategy is denoted as secure routing and resource allocation based on game theory in CCRNs (SRGC). With a reputation updating process and distributed learning algorithm, the proposed strategy can find a 'best' route, which is relatively safe for each primary transmitter, and at the same time fully utilizes the spectrum and energy. Using NS2, simulations indicate that SRGC can well fit into CCRNs, improve the network performance and defend against the routing disruption attacks. Compared with other schemes, the SRGC results in a performance with better adaptability to the distributed environment. Moreover, SRGC can maximize the average throughput and minimize the data drop ratios. SECURE ROUTING AND POWER CONTROL BASED ON GAME THEORY 2959 of cooperative relaying has emerged as a powerful technique because of its ability to exploit user diversity and provide high reliability and capacity in wireless networks [5].On the other hand, with the pervasiveness of big data, touching on everything we do, our attack surface will be altered and expanded, and our risks will be magnified in ways we could not have imagined [6]. This is especially true in CCRNs. In the cooperative communication, SUs will be able to use networks' resources, but a legitimate SU may be selfish and misbehaves during cooperation when it is selected to be the relay. In order to pursue more self-benefits, a dishonest SU may not obey the cooperation rule during the transmission. In a word, without considering these security threats, the PUs may choose some untrustworthy SUs to be relays, which will cause the failure of the cooperation. Moreover, PUs in CCRNs have the priority to use the channels and the demand of relaying by SUs to reduce its own energy consumption. Besides, the relays obtain transmission opportunities from the PUs as rewards and need incentive for cooperation [7]. Hence, we formulate the interaction between PUs and SUs as a Stackelberg game.For multi-user cooperation, the issues of route selection and coordination need to be considered in CCRN [8]. When a PU wishes to send packets to its receiver, it will initiate route discovery. A transmitter may find several routes and can cache these routes in its route cache. It makes more difficult for a primary transmitter to ch...