Cognitive reflection vs. calculation in decision making

Abstract

Scores on the three-item Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) have been linked with dual-system theory and normative decision making (Frederick, 2005). In particular, the CRT is thought to measure monitoring of System 1 intuitions such that, if cognitive reflection is high enough, intuitive errors will be detected and the problem will be solved. However, CRT items also require numeric ability to be answered correctly and it is unclear how much numeric ability vs. cognitive reflection contributes to better decision making. In two studies, CRT responses were used to calculate Cognitive Reflection and numeric ability; a numeracy scale was also administered. Numeric ability, measured on the CRT or the numeracy scale, accounted for the CRT's ability to predict more normative decisions (a subscale of decision-making competence, incentivized measures of impatient and risk-averse choice, and self-reported financial outcomes); Cognitive Reflection contributed no independent predictive power. Results were similar whether the two abilities were modeled (Study 1) or calculated using proportions (Studies 1 and 2). These findings demonstrate numeric ability as a robust predictor of superior decision making across multiple tasks and outcomes. They also indicate that correlations of decision performance with the CRT are insufficient evidence to implicate overriding intuitions in the decision-making biases and outcomes we examined. Numeric ability appears to be the key mechanism instead.

Are there gender differences in cognitive reflection? Invariance and differences related to mathematics

“…Research has shown that people who perform well on the CRT tend to perform well on numeracy tests. Specifically, significant, moderate correlations have been found between performance on the CRT and mathematical ability, as indexed by numeracy, math achievement or math skills (r = 0.25, G omez-Chac on, Garc ıa-Madruga, Vila, Elos ua, & Rodr ıguez, 2014; r = 0.31, Cokely & Kelley, 2009;Primi et al, 2016; rs ranging from 0.37 to 0.51, Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012;r = 0.43, Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014;Weller et al, 2013; r = 0.44 with numeracy and r = 0.61 with calculation, Sinayev & Peters, 2015; rs ranging from 0.29 to 0.45, Morsanyi et al, 2014;r = 0.53, Finucane & Gullion, 2010; r = 0.58, Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016).…”

How to estimate how well people estimate: Evaluating measures of individual differences in the approximate number system

“…It has been estimated that numeracy issues in the United Kingdom cost £2.4 billion (about U.S. $4 billion) per year in lost productivity (Callaway, 2013). Moreover, people with greater numeric ability perform better on a diverse set of judgment and decision-making tasks (Peters, 2012;Peters, Hart, Tusler, & Fraenkel, 2014;Peters et al, 2006;Sinayev & Peters, 2015).…”

For Value or for Worth? Part 2: A Neuroeconomical Thought-Action-Mood-Space Modulated by (Un-)Certainty as Sign- or Goal-tracking

“…The sufficient checking of a purportedly rapid less effortful intuitive system-1 (5+DA) by a more reflective system-2 in otherwise biased decisions, has been strongly complemen-ted by a core role of even less intuitive numerical abilities (4DT) [116].…”