Cognitive Science and Metaphysics

Schaffer, Jonathan

doi:10.1002/9781118609378.ch16

Cited by 7 publications

References 53 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

Looking across languages: Anglocentrism, cross-linguistic experimental philosophy, and the future of inquiry about truth

Wyatt,

Ulatowski

2024

AJPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Analytic debates about truth are wide-ranging, but certain key themes tend to crop up time and again. The three themes that we will examine in this paper are (i) the nature and behaviour of the ordinary concept of truth, (ii) the meaning of discourse about truth, and (iii) the nature of the property truth. We will start by offering a brief overview of the debates centring on these themes. We will then argue that cross-linguistic experimental philosophy has an indispensable yet underappreciated role to play in all of these debates. Recognising the indispensability of cross-linguistic experimental philosophy should compel philosophers to significantly revise the ways in which they inquire about truth. It should also prompt analytic philosophers more generally to consider whether similar revisions might be necessary elsewhere in the field.

show abstract

Looking across languages: Anglocentrism, cross-linguistic experimental philosophy, and the future of inquiry about truth

Wyatt,

Ulatowski

2024

AJPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Intuitions about Objects: From Teleology to Elimination

Kovacs

2019

Mind

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In a series of recent papers, David Rose and Jonathan Schaffer use a number of experiments to show that folk intuitions about composition and persistence are driven by pre-scientific teleological tendencies. They argue that these intuitions are fit for debunking and that the playing field for competing accounts of composition and persistence should therefore be considered even: no view draws more support from folk intuitions than its rivals, and the choice between them should be made exclusively on the basis of theoretical considerations. In this paper I argue that Rose and Schaffer draw the wrong conclusion from their own findings, which should instead push us toward sparse views about composition and persistence. Most metaphysicians (including Schaffer himself, and arguably Rose too) should be worried by this result, since they hold views that are flatly incompatible with it.

show abstract

Modal Prospection

McCoy¹,

Paul²,

Ullman³

2019

Metaphysics and Cognitive Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Drawing together the metaphysics of counterfactuals with empirical work on intuitive judgments, this chapter discusses the nature of counterfactual reasoning about self-involving possibilities. It argues that when a person reasons about her self-involving possibilities, especially far-fetched possibilities, this reasoning may be supported by an underlying “self simulator,” a kind of mental engine with an approximate understanding of who she is, which enables her to learn about her preferences and make intuitive judgments and predictions about her self-involving possibilities. On this view, through observing or simulating their own choices, people understand themselves through a process similar to that by which they understand other people. In this way, they learn about their own beliefs and desires. The argument is informed by empirical data from surveys where lay people and philosophers decided what action they would take in vignettes involving a potentially transformative decision.

show abstract

Cognitive Science and Metaphysics

Cited by 7 publications

References 53 publications

Looking across languages: Anglocentrism, cross-linguistic experimental philosophy, and the future of inquiry about truth

Looking across languages: Anglocentrism, cross-linguistic experimental philosophy, and the future of inquiry about truth

Intuitions about Objects: From Teleology to Elimination

Modal Prospection

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About