Cognitive tuning, encoding, and the attribution of causality

Abstract

Subjects were given a transmission or reception set before or after viewing a videotape of an event which involved an extreme outcome. The results indicated that transmitters made relatively extreme attributions to plausible causal agents when the set was given prior but not subsequent to viewing the event. The results also showed that subjects who had been given a transmission set before viewing the videotape exhibited relatively high recognition of aspects of the event they observed. It is suggested that the data provide support for an encoding interpretation of transmission-reception differences in the attribution of causality.Zajonc (1960) defined cognitive tuning in terms of an individual's principal role in the communication process (i.e., whether a person's task was to transmit or to receive information). Tuning sets are thought to affect the flexibility of an individual's cognitive structure, which in turn may affect impressions formed about others. Individuals set to transmit information are hypothesized to have a relatively fixed and polarized cognitive structure which results in the exclusion of contradictory information. Receivers, on the other hand, should tend to have a more open and flexible cognitive structure, resulting in more openness to contradictory information.Consistent with Zajonc's (1960) formulation, Cohen (1961 found that individuals expecting to transmit an impression were more prone to suppress contradictory information and exhibited more polarized impressions than did expectant receivers. Leventhal (1962) reported that expectant transmitters developed more simplified and unified impressions than did expectant receivers. Brock and Fromkin (1968) found that expectant transmitters chose to listen more to information supportive of their initial impressions of another person than did expectant receivers. Mazis (1973) extended the tuning formulation beyond person perception and found that expectant transmitters

The emergence of coherence over the course of decision making.

“…One explanation for this discrepancy might have to do with the intensity of engagement demanded by the materials. For example, the Zajonc (1960) experiment involved reading a description of a person in a period of 2 min; the Boninger et al (1990) experiments involved reading a brief essay or an advertisement; and the Harkins et al (1977) experiment involved watching an 8.5-min video clip. In comparison, the legal case we used was complex and ambiguous, it was laid out in three single-spaced pages, and it required grappling with 12 rather complicated arguments.…”

Discovery of Reliable Attitude Change Persistence Resulting from a Transmitter Tuning Set

“…Zajonc found that transmitters encode incoming information into a more complex, organized, unified, and differentiated cognitive structure than do receivers. Cognitive tuning theory has since been applied in the context of attribution of causality (Harkins, Harvey, Keithly, & Rich, 1977;Harvey, Harkins, Kagehiro, 1976), impression formation (Cohen, 1961;Higgins, McCann, & Fundacaro, 1982), and receptivity to discrepant information (Brock & Fromkin, 1968). This body of research has revealed that transmitters, in comparison to receivers and controls, form cognitive structures that are more well-developed, more coherent, and more one sided (Cohen, 1961;Higgins et aI., 1982;Zajonc, 1960).…”

Cognitive Set and Clinical Inference: Referral Information May Not (Always) Affect Psychosocial Assessment

“…Once admitted, although behaving normally and recognized by other patients as being normal, their behaviors were interpreted by staff as supportive of their presumed psychiatric condition. Cognitive set studies also demonstrated the effect of preexisting cognitions on clinical inference (Harkins, Harvey, Keithly, & Rich, 1977;Harvey, Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1974;Harvey, Harkins, & Kagehiro, 1976;Harvey, Yarkin, Lightner, & Town, 1980;Regan & Totten, 1975;Yarkin, Harvey, & Bloxom, 1981;Yarkin, Town, & Harvey, 1981). The basic paradigm of these studies consisted of showing participants a videotape of a target person in a social situation, along with providing them with cognitive tuning instructions (information transmitter role vs. information receiver role; Harkins et al, 1977;Harvey et al, 1976), or instructions to emphasize with vs. to merely observe the target (Harvey et al, 1980;Regan & Totten, 1975;Yarkin, Town & Harvey, 1981).…”

“…Cognitive set studies also demonstrated the effect of preexisting cognitions on clinical inference (Harkins, Harvey, Keithly, & Rich, 1977;Harvey, Arkin, Gleason, & Johnston, 1974;Harvey, Harkins, & Kagehiro, 1976;Harvey, Yarkin, Lightner, & Town, 1980;Regan & Totten, 1975;Yarkin, Harvey, & Bloxom, 1981;Yarkin, Town, & Harvey, 1981). The basic paradigm of these studies consisted of showing participants a videotape of a target person in a social situation, along with providing them with cognitive tuning instructions (information transmitter role vs. information receiver role; Harkins et al, 1977;Harvey et al, 1976), or instructions to emphasize with vs. to merely observe the target (Harvey et al, 1980;Regan & Totten, 1975;Yarkin, Town & Harvey, 1981). In some studies, participants were told to anticipate a later interaction with the videotaped target (Harvey et al, 1980;Yarkin, Harvey, & Bloxom, 1981), received information about the expected or observed outcome of the target's behavior (Harvey et al, 1974;Harvey et al, 1980;Yarkin, Town, & Harvey, 1981), or were informed about the target's psychological status (Harvey et al, 1980, Study 4;Yarkin, Harvey, & Bloxom, 1981).…”

“…Also, such sets and transmitter (cognitive tuning) sets determined the-direction of subsequent observations (Harkins et al, 1977;Harvey et al, 1974Harvey et al, , 1976Regan & Totten, 1975). Furthermore, later interactions of the participants with the target were positively affected .…”