Cohabitation and Marriage in a Risky World

Nordblom, Katarina

doi:10.1007/s11150-004-5650-x

Cited by 21 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…This model does not belong to either the class of unitary preference models, nor to one of collective preference models. As it can encompass both partial and complete risk pooling, it can accommodate both cohabiting and married couples, and is quite similar to a model recently published by Nordblom (2004).…”

Section: A Model Of Partial Income Pooling With Heterogeneous Preferementioning

confidence: 88%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Family dissolution and precautionary savings: an empirical analysis

Pericoli

Ventura

2011

Rev Econ Household

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The main research question of this paper is whether or not the risk of family disruption has an impact on the consumption/saving decisions of households. Although little empirical work exists in this area, often presenting indirect evidence, the theory is divided over the effect of family risk over saving and wealth accumulation. By using data from the Italian Survey on Households Income and Wealth, we build a probabilistic model to assess the probability of marital splitting, and then we insert this probability as a distinct or interacted regressor, in a statistically consistent way, into a linear model of consumption. Furthermore, we study the differential behaviour, in terms of consumption/saving choices, of couples experiencing marital splitting over the subsequent two years. The main result of our analysis is that family disruption risk generates precautionary savings, reducing current consumption. In fact, according to our estimates, on average, the risk of divorce generates an amount of additional yearly precautionary savings of around 800 euros at constant prices of the year 2000, which represents 11% of overall household savings.

show abstract

Section: A Model Of Partial Income Pooling With Heterogeneous Preferementioning

confidence: 88%

“…An example of the latter applied to the analysis of saving decisions is Nordblom (2004). Consumption decisions of individuals in couples have been modelled as individual decisions e.g.…”

Section: A Model Of Partial Income Pooling With Heterogeneous Preferementioning

confidence: 99%

Family dissolution and precautionary savings: an empirical analysis

Pericoli

Ventura

2011

Rev Econ Household

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Thus, it would be worth incorporating in a strategic model the existence of alternative options to marriage with children, thus apart of the option "staying alone", adding opportunities such as forming a household without marrying (or delaying marriage) or without having children, or having a relationship without forming a household (until more information is obtained on the partner). As far as I am aware, little has been done at a theoretical level (see Nordblom (2004)). One difficulty is that the influence of the divorce law should have to be also investigated in conjunction with the incentives provided by other forms of legal arrangements such as the taxation system and fiscal law 17 .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis

Langlais¹

2010

Recherches Économiques De Louvain

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, taking into account that: 1/ the decisions to engage in marriage and then to divorce or to stay married are fundamentally sequential decisions; 2/ household consumption has a large joint component, generating economies of scale. The unilateral divorce law is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and a monetary transfer to the parent having custody of the children. We analyze the influence of alternative compensation rules both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages). We also show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage ontracting; particularly when consideration of parents' altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases. JEL Classification: D1-K10-K12-K41-J12Keywords: marriage models, unilateral divorce law, the parents' altruism and protective measures for children.Come on now, honey [Ah! Gudule] Don't you wanna live with me?Excuse-toi (M. Jagger -K. Richards) Ou je reprends tout ça. (B. Vian) * University Nancy 2, UFR AES, 4 Rue de la Ravinelle -CO 7026, 54035 Nancy cedex, France; tel: 03 83 19 27 60; Eric.Langlais@univ-nancy2.fr.† I am grateful to Yannick Gabuthy and Nuno Garoupa for their comments on a previous draft of the paper, and also to the referees of the journal for their stimulating criticisms and suggestions. As usual, all remaining errors are mine.

show abstract

“…First, cohabitants are often seen as playing non-cooperatively (Nordblom, 2004 and references therein). Cohabitations are usually shorter lived than marriages (Brien et al, 2006; Bumpass and Sweet, 1995) and there is consensus to admit that cooperation is more likely to occur in stable couples committed in a long term relationship.…”

Section: Theoretical Backgroundmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Marriage on Couples’ Allocation of Time Between Market and Nonmarket Hours

Moreau

Lahga²

2011

Household Economic Behaviors

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in The Effects of Marriage on Couples' Allocation of Time Between Market and Non-Market Hours AbdelRahmen El Lahga Nicolas Moreau D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We evaluate the effects of the transition from cohabitation to marriage on household domestic and market work hours using a sample of working couples. For this purpose we use the 21 first waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSEOP). We adapt to system GMM estimation the estimator presented in Semykina and Wooldridge (2005) to account for selection bias in the presence of endogenous regressors. Our results indicate that marriage increases women's specialization in home-based activities and that marriage decreases women's leisure. These effects are robust across specifications.JEL Classification: J12, J22, C33, D13

show abstract

Cohabitation and Marriage in a Risky World

Cited by 21 publications

References 31 publications

Family dissolution and precautionary savings: an empirical analysis

Family dissolution and precautionary savings: an empirical analysis

On unilateral divorce and the “selection of marriages” hypothesis

The Effects of Marriage on Couples’ Allocation of Time Between Market and Nonmarket Hours

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About