Cohen’s Conservatism and Human Enhancement

Abstract

In an intriguing essay, G. A. Cohen has defended a conservative bias in favour of existing value. In this paper, we consider whether Cohen's conservatism raises a new challenge to the use of human enhancement technologies. We develop some of Cohen's suggestive remarks into a new line of argument against human enhancement that, we believe, is in several ways superior to existing objections. However, we shall argue that on closer inspection, Cohen's conservatism fails to offer grounds for a strong sweeping objection to enhancement, and may even offer positive support for forms of enhancement that preserve valuable features of human beings. Nevertheless, we concede that Cohen's arguments may suggest some plausible and important constraints on the modality of legitimate and desirable enhancements.

Enhancement and the Conservative Bias

“…An evaluative approach is concerned not with the question of what allows us to persist as the same person over time, say, but with "what makes our continued existence meaningful or valuable", quite apart from whether we are the same metaphysical individual (2013,57). Pugh et al (2013) suggest that something like Cohen conservatism may ground a particular objection to certain forms of self-enhancement on the grounds we have reason to preserve our own nature (since we are a source of value) as it is, even if the change would be an improvement. Still, they note that some changes, including enhancements, can respect existing value, while others might be necessary to preserve existing value.…”

An evaluative conservative case for biomedical enhancement

“…Cohen's conservatism holds that there is reason to favour an existing source of value (V 1 ) over a potential/future value (V 2 ), even if there is also reason to suspect that the (expected) value of V 2 would be greater than V 1 . An example helps 3. Suppose you currently have a pet dog—call him Fido.…”

“…Cohen believed, and others have agreed, that evaluative conservatism provided powerful reasons to oppose enhancement 3. Likewise, recent anti-enhancement authors such as Nicholas Agar and Michael Hauskeller,4 13–15 although not explicitly calling themselves conservatives, have challenged the enhancement project on the grounds that it threatens existing sources of value.…”

“…Pugh et al 3 have pointed out that Cohen's conservatism can be used to defend some forms of enhancement. For instance, they argue that life extension therapy can be defended on the grounds that it preserves the value that attaches to our current lives and, similarly, mood enhancement drugs can be defended on the grounds that they allow us to preserve the value of existing interpersonal relationships.…”

“…iPugh et al 3 discuss the distinction between valuing the valuable and valuing the valued. The former is about intrinsic value, the latter is about personal history with the source of value.…”