2017
DOI: 10.1017/s0047279417000514
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Cohesion policy after Brexit: the economic, social and institutional challenges

Abstract: Since 1988, when the current EU Cohesion Policy was introduced, it has played an influential role in setting priorities for policies aimed at dealing with the effects of European economic integration on regional and social disparities. Although, latterly, the amount of money spent in the UK through the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) has declined, EU programmes have had a disproportionate effect on the design and implementation of UK policies shaping regional and local economic and social devel… Show more

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Cited by 38 publications
(42 citation statements)
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“…Although it is too early to predict any deeper spatial impact of Brexit on places where “new” EU migrants are more concentrated, the potential loss of EU Structural Funds for the United Kingdom may add additional economic uncertainties for CEE migrants, and indeed for the alienated “native” working classes in these disadvantaged regions, the victims of the Conservative government's politics of austerity, who were one of the main groups voting for Brexit (Morgan, ). In the meantime, the possible combination of blocked migration to Britain and enlarged return flows of CEE migrants may require new employment‐related regional policies for areas and countries affected by these “reversed” migration trends (Bachtler & Begg, , ; Di Cataldo, ).…”
Section: “The Future Is Open” or Not?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although it is too early to predict any deeper spatial impact of Brexit on places where “new” EU migrants are more concentrated, the potential loss of EU Structural Funds for the United Kingdom may add additional economic uncertainties for CEE migrants, and indeed for the alienated “native” working classes in these disadvantaged regions, the victims of the Conservative government's politics of austerity, who were one of the main groups voting for Brexit (Morgan, ). In the meantime, the possible combination of blocked migration to Britain and enlarged return flows of CEE migrants may require new employment‐related regional policies for areas and countries affected by these “reversed” migration trends (Bachtler & Begg, , ; Di Cataldo, ).…”
Section: “The Future Is Open” or Not?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The many interviews across the socio-economic and political spectrum in the UK two years before the referendum (HMG, 2014a-d), and the innumerable debates, hearings and blogs during and following the referendum campaign showed that opinion within the UK remained deeply divided, both horizontally and vertically, concerning the most effective balance between EU and member state competence, and between economic and social objectives (see also Bachtler and Begg, 2017). These divisions add to the difficulty of predicting to what extent social legislation implemented since the UK joined the EEC will be removed or amended, and whether the remaining EU member states will seek to develop binding social legislation.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A second question, related to communication and awareness, centres on how well 'embedded' EU regional spending has been in the UK. This is especially the case in England, where, following the abolition of regional development agencies in 2010, the subnational institutional landscape has been in a state of flux, preventing a long-term and coherent approach to EU regional policy being developed (Bachtler & Begg, 2017). The management of EU regional spending has also become centralized.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There has already been some discussion on post-Brexit Cohesion Policy and regional funding (e.g., Bachtler & Begg, 2017;Bell, 2017;Di Cataldo, 2017;Huggins, 2018; Sykes & Schulze Bäing, 2017). However, analysis into the role of EU regional spending in influencing the referendum outcome is lacking.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%