2021
DOI: 10.1007/s10479-021-04005-3
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Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations

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Cited by 3 publications
(1 citation statement)
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“…The Equal allocation of non-separable costs (EANC) method 70 , 71 : where is the separable benefit, and is the remaining benefit of member . indicates the final benefit allocation, U means a coalition with member, is the benefit of coalition except , and represents the value of the grand coalition, is the value of members in non-cooperation situations.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The Equal allocation of non-separable costs (EANC) method 70 , 71 : where is the separable benefit, and is the remaining benefit of member . indicates the final benefit allocation, U means a coalition with member, is the benefit of coalition except , and represents the value of the grand coalition, is the value of members in non-cooperation situations.…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%