Cold Boot Attacks on Bliss

Villanueva-Polanco, Ricardo

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-30530-7_3

Cited by 16 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…In CEMA, the general outcomes are extremely noisy and do not appear sharp in comparison to CPA results of the study [8]. Therefore, it is quite disappointing from the attacker's side.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 71%

“…In CEMA modelling, the choice of method was HW because of its efficacy. The accuracy of the model was validated using the test results for [8]. The steps of the procedure:…”

Section: Attack Modellingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… Cache attack: Cache access is monitored in a shared physical system [6,7], i.e., virtual machines, cloud, etc.  Data remanence attack: Sensitive data is recycled after deletion, i.e., coldboot attack [8].  Timing attack: Running time is monitored.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Electromagnetic Analysis of an Ultra-Lightweight Cipher: PRESENT

Gunathilake¹,

Al‐Dubai²,

Buchanan³

et al. 2021

Computer Science &Amp; Information Technology (CS &Amp; IT)

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Side-channel attacks are an unpredictable risk factor in cryptography. Therefore, continuous observations of physical leakages are essential to minimise vulnerabilities associated with cryptographic functions. Lightweight cryptography is a novel approach in progress towards internet-of-things (IoT) security. Thus, it would provide sufficient data and privacy protection in such a constrained ecosystem. IoT devices are resource-limited in terms of data rates (in kbps), power maintainability (battery) as well as hardware and software footprints (physical size, internal memory, RAM/ROM). Due to the difficulty in handling conventional cryptographic algorithms, lightweight ciphers consist of small key sizes, block sizes and few operational rounds. Unlike in the past, affordability to perform side-channel attacks using inexpensive electronic circuitries is becoming a reality. Hence, cryptanalysis of physical leakage in these emerging ciphers is crucial. Among existing studies, power analysis seems to have enough attention in research, whereas other aspects such as electromagnetic, timing, cache and optical attacks continue to be appropriately evaluated to play a role in forensic analysis. As a result, we started analysing electromagnetic emission leakage of an ultra-lightweight block cipher, PRESENT. According to the literature, PRESENT promises to be adequate for IoT devices, and there still seems not to exist any work regarding correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) of it. Firstly, we conducted simple electromagnetic analysis in both time and frequency domains and then proceeded towards CEMA attack modelling. This paper provides a summary of the related literature (IoT, lightweight cryptography, side-channel attacks and EMA), our methodology, current outcomes and future plans for the optimised results.

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“…In CEMA, the general outcomes are extremely noisy and do not appear sharp in comparison to CPA results of the study [8]. Therefore, it is quite disappointing from the attacker's side.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 71%

“…In CEMA modelling, the choice of method was HW because of its efficacy. The accuracy of the model was validated using the test results for [8]. The steps of the procedure:…”

Section: Attack Modellingmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Electromagnetic Analysis of an Ultra-Lightweight Cipher: PRESENT

Gunathilake¹,

Al‐Dubai²,

Buchanan³

et al. 2021

Computer Science &Amp; Information Technology (CS &Amp; IT)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Their cold boot key-recovery algorithms were applicable to the true cold boot scenario and exploited redundancies found in the in-memory private key representations from two popular NTRU implementations. This work was followed up by that of Villanueva-Polanco [11], which studied cold boot attacks against the strongSwan implementation of the BLISS signature scheme and presented key-recovery algorithms based on key enumeration algorithms for the in-memory private key encoding used in this implementation.…”

Section: Cold Boot Attacksmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Study of the Key Enumeration Problem

Villanueva-Polanco

2019

Entropy

Self Cite

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In this paper, we will study the key enumeration problem, which is connected to the key recovery problem posed in the cold boot attack setting. In this setting, an attacker with physical access to a computer may obtain noisy data of a cryptographic secret key of a cryptographic scheme from main memory via this data remanence attack. Therefore, the attacker would need a key-recovery algorithm to reconstruct the secret key from its noisy version. We will first describe this attack setting and then pose the problem of key recovery in a general way and establish a connection between the key recovery problem and the key enumeration problem. The latter problem has already been studied in the side-channel attack literature, where, for example, the attacker might procure scoring information for each byte of an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) key from a side-channel attack and then want to efficiently enumerate and test a large number of complete 16-byte candidates until the correct key is found. After establishing such a connection between the key recovery problem and the key enumeration problem, we will present a comprehensive review of the most outstanding key enumeration algorithms to tackle the latter problem, for example, an optimal key enumeration algorithm (OKEA) and several nonoptimal key enumeration algorithms. Also, we will propose variants to some of them and make a comparison of them, highlighting their strengths and weaknesses.

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“…Regarding the second task, we assume the attacker estimate α, the probability for a 0 bit of original content to turn to a 1 bit, and β, the probability for a 1 bit of original content to turn to a 0 bit, as per the cold boot model described in Section 2.2. Lastly, we develop our key-recovery algorithm based on a general key-recovery strategy introduced in [11]. Basically, by exploiting and combining the optimal key enumeration algorithm [12], and a non-optimal key enumeration algorithm, as in [11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27], we are able to get a suitable algorithm for the key-recovery task.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cold Boot Attacks on the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) Mechanism

Villanueva-Polanco

Angulo-Madrid

2020

Applied Sciences

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This research paper evaluates the feasibility of cold boot attacks on the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) mechanism. This key encapsulation mechanism has been included in the list of alternate candidates of the third round of the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization Process. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time this scheme is assessed in the cold boot attacks setting. In particular, our evaluation is focused on the reference implementation of this scheme. Furthermore, we present a dedicated key-recovery algorithm for SIKE in this setting and show that the key recovery algorithm works for all the parameter sets recommended for this scheme. Moreover, we compute the success rates of our key recovery algorithm through simulations and show the key recovery algorithm may reconstruct the SIKE secret key for any SIKE parameters for a fixed and small α=0.001 (the probability of a 0 to 1 bit-flipping) and varying values for β (the probability of a 1 to 0 bit-flipping) in the set {0.001,0.01,…,0.1}. Additionally, we show how to integrate a quantum key enumeration algorithm with our key-recovery algorithm to improve its overall performance.

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Cold Boot Attacks on Bliss

Cited by 16 publications

References 22 publications

Electromagnetic Analysis of an Ultra-Lightweight Cipher: PRESENT

Electromagnetic Analysis of an Ultra-Lightweight Cipher: PRESENT

A Comprehensive Study of the Key Enumeration Problem

Cold Boot Attacks on the Supersingular Isogeny Key Encapsulation (SIKE) Mechanism

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