Cold, dark, and dangerous: international cooperation in the arctic and space

Abstract

This article compares Russian–Western cooperation in the Arctic and Space, with a focus on why cooperation continued after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. On the basis of this comparative approach, continued cooperation is linked to the following factors: (1) the Arctic and Space are remote and extreme environments; (2) they are militarised but not substantially weaponised; (3) they both suffer from ‘tragedies of the commons’; (4) Arctic and Space-faring states engage in risk management through international law-making; (5) Arctic and Space relations rely on consensus decision-making; (6) Arctic and Space relations rely on soft law; (7) Arctic states and Space-faring states interact within a situation of ‘complex interdependence’; (8) Russia and the United States are resisting greater Chinese involvement in these regions. The article concludes with the following contribution to international relations theory: The more that states need to cooperate in a particular region or issue-area, and the more they become accustomed to doing so, the more resilient that cooperation will become to tensions and breakdowns in other regions and issue-areas. This phenomenon can be termed ‘complex and resilient interdependence’, to signify that complex independence is more than a description. It can, sometimes, affect the course of state-to-state relations.

Arctic Security and Outer Space

“…I have carried this insight further in my own work, arguing that separation can prevent a disruption in one dimension of an interstate relationship from spreading to other dimensions (Byers, 2017). My previous research has revealed that this was what occurred in the Arctic and in Space after the annexation of Crimea (Byers, 2017;Byers, 2019).…”

“…However, the negotiators of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty were addressing very similar issues when they prohibited national appropriation of the Moon and other celestial bodies (Outer Space Treaty, 1967). In addition to the rules found in treaties and customary international law, a great deal of 'soft law' has been developed for the Arctic and for Space-in the form of guidelines, codes of conduct, and even 'soft treaties' that are legally binding but contain provisions that are ambiguous, qualified by non-obligatory language, or redundant (Byers, 2019). For example, the Arctic Council was created by a declaration rather than a treaty, while the challenge of Space debris is so far being addressed by guidelines adopted by the Inter-Agency Space Debris Committee and the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (Arctic Council, 1996;IADC, 2007;COPUOS, 2007).…”

“…Another factor in continued cooperation concerns the ' cold, dark, and dangerous' characters of the Arctic and Space (Byers, 2019). In every region of the world, natural factors such as geography, climate, and the presence or absence of resources play a role in national interests and policy preferences.…”

Outer Space Breakthrough of the U.S. and Its Impact on Russia and the World

“…Space scientific cooperation has not been disrupted by the geopolitical crises that erupted between the West and Russia. 24 In the same vein, this scientific diplomacy is an opportune instrument for Moscow. In the long term, this working cooperative link may in due course facilitate confidence-building with its Western partners.…”

Ine Eriksen Søreide: nordområdene, USA og balansekunst

“…Samtidig, i en nordområdekontekst med hensyn på utenrikspolitikk, bruker jeg dette begrepet i 9 Forestillingene om en ressurskrig i nord har derimot mer eller mindre blitt forkastet, gitt det faktum at havretten allerede gir de arktiske kyststatene suverene rettigheter i de fleste av disse områdene (Dodds & Nuttall, 2016;Tamnes & Offerdal, 2014). Faktisk er ressursgrunnlaget i Arktis ofte heller brukt som et argument for hvorfor kyststatene ønsker å samarbeide om regional utvikling (Byers, 2019;Lackenbauer, 2021;Østhagen & Rottem, 2020). 10 Se Tunsjø, 2018, for mer om dette samspillet.…”