Cold War Pressures, Regional Strategies, and Relative Decline: British Military and Strategic Planning for Cyprus, 1950–1960

Abstract

In the early period after World War II, Cyprus became useful to Britain both for the military projection of British power in the Middle East, and for the planning of an air campaign against the Soviet Union itself. At the same time, the mounting British difficulties in the Middle East, especially the loss of the Suez base in 1954, meant that Cyprus, under full British sovereignty, was the most “secure” British position in the region. Thus, strategic and military needs were important in the British decision to retain the island. Even after Cypriot independence in 1960, London retained two large sovereign bases in Cyprus.

The Cold War Tension in Greece and the Continuation of British Rule in Cyprus, 1945-1950

“…What is more, the determination of Bevin, the Foreign Office and the COS to retain British sovereignty in Cyprus was reinforced by Britain's relative decline in the Middle East region and the loss of other regional assets, including Palestine in 1948, Egypt's challenge to Britain over the Sudan and the Suez base, and Prime Minister Mohammed Mussadiq's open defiance of Britain in Iran in the early 1950s. 64 Britain saw Cyprus as the better option and believed it should be retained under British possession. As noted by the War Office in 1951, 'much instability has been caused in the Middle East by moves and rumours of moves of British troops.…”

The Cold War And The Retention Of British Rule In Cyprus, 1945-1947

“…Historians such as Wm. Roger Louis (1978), Allan Bullock (1983), George H. Kelling (1990), Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (2009) and Simon Ball (2010) discussed that the British Foreign Office's decision for Cyprus to remain under Britain's possession was because of the strategic geographical location of Cyprus as a valuable asset for Britain's Middle Eastern position. Bullock, for instance, argues that Cyprus became increasingly prominence to Britain was primarily because of the latter's geostrategic and security interests towards the Middle East region (Bullock, 1983).…”

“…Ball stresses that although British bases on Cyprus were too far to the east to be useful in the usual run of the Mediterranean operations, these bases were perfectly placed for use against ships trying to make a run from Greece to Syria (Ball, 2010). According to Hatzivassiliou (2009), as the Palestine mandate collapsed and the rebellion in Palestine failed to be solved effectively, and the bases in Iraq and Suez became harder to hold on to, Cyprus was seen by the British government as preferable alternative for new bases, thus Britain should keep its possession of this island. As stated by Hatzivassiliou (2009): 'Much instability has been caused in the Middle East by moves and rumours of moves of British troops.…”

“…According to Hatzivassiliou (2009), as the Palestine mandate collapsed and the rebellion in Palestine failed to be solved effectively, and the bases in Iraq and Suez became harder to hold on to, Cyprus was seen by the British government as preferable alternative for new bases, thus Britain should keep its possession of this island. As stated by Hatzivassiliou (2009): 'Much instability has been caused in the Middle East by moves and rumours of moves of British troops. A stable and firmly held British stronghold on Cyprus is therefore of the greatest strategic importance' (p. 1151).…”

“…However, Greece's interest over Cyprus was once again revived after World War II came to an end. As Greece participated in the World War II as Britain's only fighting ally in the Eastern Mediterranean region, the British government therefore was ready to consider enosis (Hatzivassiliou, 2009). Accordingly, this new development forced ministers and officials in the newly elected Labour government that came into office in July 1945, to reconsider Britain's position in Cyprus and to reevaluate British strategic interest in Cyprus.…”