2023
DOI: 10.1016/j.isci.2023.106750
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Collaborative and selfish mitigation strategies to tackle energy scarcity: The case of the European gas crisis

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
2
1
1

Citation Types

0
1
0

Year Published

2023
2023
2024
2024

Publication Types

Select...
6
1
1

Relationship

0
8

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 11 publications
(4 citation statements)
references
References 8 publications
0
1
0
Order By: Relevance
“…However, the lack of alternative gas distribution options for some of the countries makes it impossible to meet this target. This issue is particularly relevant for Central Europe, as the transmission infrastructure in this region mainly allows gas to be transported from Russia [67]. In 2022, gas deliveries through Ukraine decreased significantly, and notably, the transmission through the Yamal-Europe and Nord Stream pipelines ceased entirely.…”
Section: Opportunities 431 Replacing Russian Gas In the Central Europ...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the lack of alternative gas distribution options for some of the countries makes it impossible to meet this target. This issue is particularly relevant for Central Europe, as the transmission infrastructure in this region mainly allows gas to be transported from Russia [67]. In 2022, gas deliveries through Ukraine decreased significantly, and notably, the transmission through the Yamal-Europe and Nord Stream pipelines ceased entirely.…”
Section: Opportunities 431 Replacing Russian Gas In the Central Europ...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many EU countries also prioritised decoupling their economies from Russian fossil fuels at the national level, adopting a range of energy [18] and fiscal [19] measures towards mitigating the impact of higher costs on consumers and businesses, stabilising wholesale prices, and securing their energy supply. Although the coordinated European response entails measures to reduce energy vulnerability [20], entirely replacing Russian gas imports will be challenging in the near-term [21,22], with non-pipeline Russian gas still finding its way to Europe [23,24]. Ongoing and planned liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructures are projected to increase today's EU terminal capacity by 48 % until 2030, with risks of possibly becoming stranded assets due to a mismatch with reductions in gas demand to meet climate objectives [25].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At the beginning of 2023, Russia still exported some 5 TWh per week via Turkstream and Ukraine (15 % of pre-war volumes) as well as some 3.5 TWh as LNG-which would over the year sum up to around 440 TWh. Assuming that the EU eventually loses the entire amount of about 1500 TWh of annual imports [22] relative to pre-war levels and that this reduction is permanent, the Union must seek ways in which it can optimally replace this loss. However, the impacts of gas market disruptions on the European energy system and overall economy and, in turn, the effects of EU responses on its transition pathway and 2030 climate targets remain uncertain [27][28][29].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Em 2020 apresentou um valor de 24,7% da participação total, contra 31,3% Outro fator que mostra a importância do gás natural é a recente desestabilização da economia europeia devido à crise energética ligada à elevada dependência de alguns países do gás natural proveniente da Rússia, cujo abastecimento ficou ameaçado após a invasão russa à Ucrânia e as consequentes sanções políticas e econômicas contra a Rússia. O abastecimento de gás foi reduzido em mais de 80% em novembro de 2022, levando a um aumento exacerbado dos preços de energia durante o inverno europeu, que afetou toda a economia europeia e os demais países ao redor do mundo (Mannhardt et al, 2023).…”
Section: Gás Naturalunclassified