2004
DOI: 10.1093/oep/gpf045
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Collaborative tax evasion and social norms: why deterrence does not work

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Cited by 77 publications
(68 citation statements)
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“…Indeed, amendments to the Labour Code enacted in 2006 and 2008 merely extended the powers of control and introduced harsher penalties and fines (Loukanova andBezlov 2007, Daskalova 2013a). The problem with using this disincentives approach, however, is that tougher sanctions and improving detection decreases voluntary compliance because it undermines respect for the fairness of the system and leads to greater rather than less undeclared work (Chang and Lai 2004, Murphy 2005, Murphy and Harris 2007.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Indeed, amendments to the Labour Code enacted in 2006 and 2008 merely extended the powers of control and introduced harsher penalties and fines (Loukanova andBezlov 2007, Daskalova 2013a). The problem with using this disincentives approach, however, is that tougher sanctions and improving detection decreases voluntary compliance because it undermines respect for the fairness of the system and leads to greater rather than less undeclared work (Chang and Lai 2004, Murphy 2005, Murphy and Harris 2007.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the evidence that this is effective is less than conclusive. Although some argue that increasing the penalties and probability of detection reduces undeclared work, at least for some income groups (Klepper and Nagin, 1989;Varma and Doob, 1998), others reveal that this increases undeclared work, not least due to a breakdown of trust between the state and its citizens (Chang and Lai, 2004;Kirchler et al, 2014). Indeed, the perhaps most telling rebuttal of the rational actor model is that many voluntarily comply even when the benefit/cost ratio suggests that they should operate on an undeclared basis (Alm et al, 2012;Kirchler, 2007;Murphy, 2008;Murphy and Harris, 2007).…”
Section: Tackling Undeclared Work: Theoretical Framing and Hypothesismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The friendly persuasion group report higher earnings than the control group. 76 Examining formal institutions meanwhile, studies beyond the Balkans reveal that improving procedural justice, which refers to whether citizens perceive the government to treat them in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner, significantly improves compliance. 77 78 Similarly, so too does developing procedural fairness, which refers to the extent to which citizens believe that they are paying their fair share compared with others 79 80 81 82 and improving redistributive justice, which refers to whether citizens believe they receive the goods and services they deserve given the taxes that they pay.…”
Section: Indirect Controlsmentioning
confidence: 99%