The "Arab Spring" was a surprising event not just because predicting revolutions is a difficult task, but because current theories of revolution are ill equipped to explain revolutionary waves where interactive causal mechanisms at different levels of analysis and interactions between the units of analysis predominate. To account for such dynamics, a multidimensional social science of revolution is required. Accordingly, a meta-framework for revolutionary theory that combines multiple levels of analysis, multiple units of analysis, and their interactions is offered. A structured example of theory building is then given by detailing how the development of world cultural models and practices challenge existing political structures, affect mobilization processes, and make diffusion more likely. A structured example of study design using qualitative comparative analysis of 16 Middle Eastern and North African countries provides support for the interaction of subnational conditions for mobilization, statecentered causes, and transnational factors, including a country's linkage to world society, as one explanation of the Revolutions of 2011. Keywords Revolution. Arab spring. World culture. World society. Arab countries On January 14, 2011, the long time dictator of Tunisia, Ben Ali, fled Tunis after his military chief refused to suppress a month long popular protest against autocratic rule and corruption. Shortly thereafter, Egyptian activists launched the beginning of protests that would lead to the resignation of Hosni Mubarak, protestors occupied central squares in the capitals of Bahrain and Yemen, and Libyan and Syrian demonstrations, which later devolved into civil war, began. By March, nearly the entire Arab World, and even elsewhere, had experienced contention that almost no one seemed to anticipate. The surprising "Arab Spring" or, as I and other scholars (e.g., Goldstone 2011) might prefer it, the "Revolutions of 2011" had arrived. While many scholars of revolution would not be astonished that prediction of these events had failed (see Keddie 1995; Kuran 1995; Kurzman 2004), the New York Times reported that President Obama faulted American intelligence agencies for not expecting the revolutions (Mazzetti 2011), and a Middle East scholar faulted his own discipline