Collective action problem in heterogeneous groups

Abstract

One contribution of 13 to a theme issue 'Solving the puzzle of collective action through inter-individual differences: evidence from primates and humans'. I review the theoretical and experimental literature on the collective action problem in groups whose members differ in various characteristics affecting individual costs, benefits and preferences in collective actions. I focus on evolutionary models that predict how individual efforts and fitnesses, group efforts and the amount of produced collective goods depend on the group's size and heterogeneity, as well as on the benefit and cost functions and parameters. I consider collective actions that aim to overcome the challenges from nature or win competition with neighbouring groups of co-specifics. I show that the largest contributors towards production of collective goods will typically be group members with the highest stake in it or for whom the effort is least costly, or those who have the largest capability or initial endowment. Under some conditions, such group members end up with smaller net pay-offs than the rest of the group. That is, they effectively behave as altruists. With weak nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, the group effort typically decreases with group size and increases with within-group heterogeneity. With strong nonlinearity in benefit and cost functions, these patterns are reversed. I discuss the implications of theoretical results for animal behaviour, human origins and psychology.

Individual participation in intergroup contests is mediated by numerical assessment strategies in black howler and tufted capuchin monkeys

“…Although relative group size may provide individuals with a means to assess the competitive ability of rivals, the distribution of this assessment strategy is unclear (table 1), in part because many other factors can affect individual participation [11,12,45,46,50]. Nevertheless, both black howler and tufted capuchin monkeys appear to assess numerical asymmetries in male group size in decisions to participate in intergroup contests.…”

“…cooperative breeders [88]). To date, few studies of intergroup contests have examined the individual differences in contribution to collective defence in relation to a wide range of pay-off asymmetries that may exist among group members [39,46]. Such analyses are crucial to understand whether interspecific variation in the utility of numerical asymmetries reflects patterns of defection and free-riding (cf.…”

“…Because the marginal value of each participant decreases as coalitionary size increases [44], large group size-rather than providing a competitive advantage-may actually deter individual participation, causing the realized competitive ability to fall below the optimum [42,44]. Even when access to the contested resource provides fitness benefits to multiple group members, the cost-benefit trade-off of intergroup contests frequently differs among individuals due to factors such as sex and rank [45,46]. For example, sexual dimorphism and the presence of dependent offspring can lead to higher costs of participation for females relative to males [2].…”

Genes, psychological traits and civic engagement

“…Voting is a discrete and infrequent act. The opportunity to vote is constrained by set election dates 1 and the number of times an individual can vote is obviously limited. Accordingly, the ability to develop either a norm or a habit of voting is limited [29].…”

“…While civic participation improves life in the community as a whole, it is individually costly and thus there is an incentive to free ride on the actions of others (for a review of evolutionary models supporting this idea, see [1]). Far and away the most studied facet of civic engagement is the act of voting, a classic example of a collective action problem.…”