2006
DOI: 10.1177/000312240607100204
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Collective Action, Rival Incentives, and the Emergence of Antisocial Norms

Abstract: Centralized sanctions (selective incentives) and informal norms have been advanced as distinct solutions to collective action problems. This article investigates their interaction, modeling the emergence of norms in the presence of incentives to contribute to collective goods. Computational experiments show how collective action depends on a three-way interaction among the value of incentives, the rivalness of incentives (ranging from independence to zero-sum competition), and group cohesiveness (effectiveness… Show more

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Cited by 64 publications
(55 citation statements)
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“…But real world groups are often characterized by combinations of formal or "top down" sanctions and informal norms among peers, systems that can work together or in opposition (Homans 1961;Kitts 2006;Nee and Ingram 1998;Shibutani 1978). An important next step would be to extend the work here to address the joint effects of these two systems.…”
Section: Limitations and Directions For Future Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…But real world groups are often characterized by combinations of formal or "top down" sanctions and informal norms among peers, systems that can work together or in opposition (Homans 1961;Kitts 2006;Nee and Ingram 1998;Shibutani 1978). An important next step would be to extend the work here to address the joint effects of these two systems.…”
Section: Limitations and Directions For Future Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, groups are often characterized by multiple forms or sources of sanctions. For instance, in any given group, formal rewards and sanctions may be administered by a group leader, while informal rewards and sanctions (e.g., peer pressure or disapproval) flow between rank and file members (Kitts 2006;Shinada and Yamagishi 2007).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…When an individual performs or does not perform a given behavior, reinforcement from group members can help establish behavioral patterns that are considered desirable within that particular social context [37]. Even if a behavior is considered harmful to the individual, it may be considered desirable if its performance benefits the group [38]; it is possible that playing through injury falls into this category of behavior. This type of seemingly pro-social, but individually costly norm is thought to be most stable in highly cohesive groups [39,40].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Recent work (Harrison and Carroll 2001a, 2002, 2006) has extended the model to allow that influence is not equal across members, but may vary in force according to the strength of interpersonal ties. Focusing on the dynamics of enculturation through dyadic influence and through turnover, the extended model disregards the pulls by management and decay.…”
Section: Modelmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In an ambitious research program, Richard Harrison and Glenn Carroll (1991, 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2006 have investigated the stability and convergence of organizational culture using an integrated model of organizational demography and socialization. Of course, effective socialization has implications for recruitment and turnover, while rates of recruitment and turnover surely affect the dynamics of socialization.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%