Collective action vs. conservation auction: Lessons from a social experiment of a collective auction of water conservation contracts in Japan

Takeda, Masayuki; Takahashi, Daisuke; Shobayashi, Mikitaro

doi:10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.06.010

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Hajkowicz et al, 2007;Windle and Rolfe, 2008;Klimek et al, 2008;Windle et al, 2009;Crossman et al, 2011;Narloch et al, 2011;Reeson et al, 2011;Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann, 2011;Iftekhar et al, 2018), followed by water-related services (16 = 14 %) (e.g. Latacz-Lohmann and Schilizzi, 2007;Rolfe and Windle, 2010;Rolfe and Windle, 2011;Schilizzi and Latacz-Lohmann, 2011;Nemes et al, 2015;Takeda et al, 2015), and then by 'mixed' services (e.g. Rolfe et al, 2009;Hill et al, 2011;Jindal et al, 2013;Whitten et al, 2013;Boxall et al, 2017).…”

Section: Auctioned Ecosystems and Ecosystem Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctioning approaches for ecosystem services – Evidence and applications

Kindu

Mai

Bingham

et al. 2022

Science of The Total Environment

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Section: Auctioned Ecosystems and Ecosystem Servicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctioning approaches for ecosystem services – Evidence and applications

Kindu

Mai

Bingham

et al. 2022

Science of The Total Environment

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“…Auctions provide relatively open market settings and transparent price signals that reduce the extent of information asymmetry and agency costs among potential buyers. The gathering of traders using auctions minimizes the need for information searches, negotiations, and contracting [42]. Auctions as a transactional mechanism are common for the exchange of divisible goods, such as power systems, and general goods, such as public resources that have high information search and negotiation costs [43].…”

Section: Transaction Mode Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transaction Costs, Modes, and Scales from Agricultural to Industrial Water Rights Trading in an Inland River Basin, Northwest China

Deng

Song

2018

Water

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Water transactions from agriculture to industry have become an important means to address water scarcity and improve water economic efficiency. Transaction costs (TCs) are one of the main factors preventing water markets from forming or efficiently operating. To evaluate the level of transactions costs, we set the appropriate transaction modes for cross-sector lever water trading and evaluated the TCs from agriculture to industry in the Heihe River Basin (HRB), an inland basin in northwest China. We found that the ranges of transaction costs per m3 of water ranged from 0.06 to 1.10 yuan, and the ratios of TCs to transaction prices ranged from 4.11% to 244.44%. The transaction scale should be more than 15,267 m3 or 29,888 m3 when the TC is at the lower or upper limit in the study area. When the transaction scales are set correctly, the range of the transaction costs will be in an acceptable range, and the proportion of TCs to transaction price will not exceed the 8% limit of the California Water Bank, which was employed as a comparison. The key restrictive factor of water trading in HRB may be the low transaction scale, followed by the high water TCs. The effects of improving water use efficiency in cross-sector trading could not neutralize the restrictions caused by the negative effects of small water demand transaction scales for undeveloped secondary industries in HRB. However, considering the industrial structure and development trends of the regional economy, the future driving force of water transactions across sectors likely lies in tertiary industries in HRB.

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“…Reverse auction is a popular auction in which the roles of buyer and seller are reversed [29]. In an ordinary auction buyers compete to obtain goods or service by offering increasingly higher prices [30]. In the reverse auction [31], the sellers typically decrease prices to compete against each other and obtain business from the buyer.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dynamic Pricing Reverse Auction-Based Resource Allocation Mechanism in Cloud Workflow Systems

Ding

Liu

et al. 2016

Scientific Programming

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Market-oriented reverse auction is an efficient and cost-effective method for resource allocation in cloud workflow systems since it can dynamically allocate resources depending on the supply-demand relationship of the cloud market. However, during the auction the price of cloud resource is usually fixed, and the current resource allocation mechanisms cannot adapt to the changeable market properly which results in the low efficiency of resource utilization. To address such a problem, a dynamic pricing reverse auction-based resource allocation mechanism is proposed. During the auction, resource providers can change prices according to the trading situation so that our novel mechanism can increase the chances of making a deal and improve efficiency of resource utilization. In addition, resource providers can improve their competitiveness in the market by lowering prices, and thus users can obtain cheaper resources in shorter time which would decrease monetary cost and completion time for workflow execution. Experiments with different situations and problem sizes are conducted for dynamic pricing-based allocation mechanism (DPAM) on resource utilization and the measurement of Time⁎Cost (TC). The results show that our DPAM can outperform its representative in resource utilization, monetary cost, and completion time and also obtain the optimal price reduction rates.

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Collective action vs. conservation auction: Lessons from a social experiment of a collective auction of water conservation contracts in Japan

Cited by 11 publications

References 11 publications

Auctioning approaches for ecosystem services – Evidence and applications

Auctioning approaches for ecosystem services – Evidence and applications

Transaction Costs, Modes, and Scales from Agricultural to Industrial Water Rights Trading in an Inland River Basin, Northwest China

A Dynamic Pricing Reverse Auction-Based Resource Allocation Mechanism in Cloud Workflow Systems

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