Collective Apologies Moderate the Effects of Justice Concerns on Support for Collective Punishment

Abstract

Abstract. Following an offense, various justice concerns arise, and people might support the punishment of the offender’s entire group to restore a sense of justice (even if the other group members are innocent). We hypothesized that support for collective punishment might increase along one’s justice concerns, and that such effect can be hindered by the group’s collective apologies. In three studies, third-party observers were presented with various cases of aggression and we measured (Study 1) or manipulated (Studies 2 and 3) their justice concerns. In all studies, the presence (vs. absence) of collective apologies was additionally manipulated. The results confirmed our hypothesis thereby increasing our knowledge of both the determinants of collective punishment and the potential effects of collective apologies.

When growth mindset backfires: The effect of the perceived malleability of groups and utilitarian motives on support for collective punishment

“…Retribution also plays a role in garnering support for collective punishment (Berent et al, 2017). For instance, collective punishment can be justified by attributing responsibility to the entire group for the misbehaviour of one or a few of its members (e.g., passive or indirect responsibility; Lickel et al, 2000), or by viewing the entire group as a suitable target for punishment due to the perceived strong association between the offender and the other group members (e.g., Cushman et al, 2012;Lickel et al, 2006;Gaertner et al, 2008;Sjöström & Gollwitzer, 2015).…”

“…Accordingly, past research has shown that the motivation to punish an offender is influenced by factors such as the offender's level of responsibility (e.g., Darley & Pittman, 2003; Darley & Schultz, 1990; Feather, 1996; Miller, 2001) and the severity of the offense (Carlsmith, 2006). Retribution also plays a role in garnering support for collective punishment (Berent et al., 2017). For instance, collective punishment can be justified by attributing responsibility to the entire group for the misbehaviour of one or a few of its members (e.g., passive or indirect responsibility; Lickel et al., 2000), or by viewing the entire group as a suitable target for punishment due to the perceived strong association between the offender and the other group members (e.g., Cushman et al., 2012; Lickel et al., 2006; Gaertner et al., 2008; Sjöström & Gollwitzer, 2015).…”

“…Nevertheless, collective punishment can also be motivated by utilitarian motives, such as the prevention of future offenses (Berent et al., 2017; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Heckathorn, 1990; Nagin, 1998;). For instance, collective punishment can serve as a means to promote cooperation (Gao et al., 2015) and deter group members from committing future offenses (Berent et al., 2017).…”

“…Nevertheless, collective punishment can also be motivated by utilitarian motives, such as the prevention of future offenses (Berent et al., 2017; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Heckathorn, 1990; Nagin, 1998;). For instance, collective punishment can serve as a means to promote cooperation (Gao et al., 2015) and deter group members from committing future offenses (Berent et al., 2017). Indeed, utilitarian‐based punishment is not solely directed at past offenders to prevent recidivism but can also aim for general deterrence, influencing potential future offenders.…”

“…Research suggests that utilitarian motives are also relevant for collective punishment (e.g., Berent et al, 2017;Heckathorn, 1988Heckathorn, , 1990Weiss et al, 1997). In the present research, we contend that the utilitarian motives driving support for collective punishment are contingent on the belief that group characteristics and behaviours can change -that the group is able to (morally) change.…”