Collective Guilt Feeling Revisited

Ziv, Anita Konzelmann

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2007.01120.x

Cited by 12 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…We-phrases enable people to see themselves as part of a group which can result in e.g., experiencing an individual we-feeling of guilt (Konzelmann Ziv, 2007). If we-phrases contribute to a stronger ingroup perception, this could buffer algorithm aversion since Fraune, Šabanović, and Smith, 2020 found that ingroup robots are preferred over outgroup humans.…”

Section: The Impact Of Social Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Increased morality through social communication or decision situation worsens the acceptance of robo-advisors

Arlinghaus,

Strassmann,

Dix

2024

Preprint

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This German study (N = 317) tests social communication (i.e., self-disclosure, content intimacy, relational continuity units, we-phrases) as a potential compensation strategy for algorithm aversion. Therefore, we explore the acceptance of a robot as an advisor in non-moral, somewhat moral, and very moral decision situations and compare the influence of two verbal communication styles of the robot (functional vs. social). Subjects followed the robot’s recommendation similarly often for both communication styles (functional vs. social), but more often in the non-moral decision situation than in the moral decision situations. Subjects perceived the robot as more human and more moral during social communication than during functional communication but similarly trustworthy, likable, and intelligent for both communication styles. In moral decision situations, subjects ascribed more anthropomorphism and morality but less trust, likability, and intelligence to the robot compared to the non-moral decision situation. Subjects perceive the robot as more moral in social communication. This unexpectedly led to subjects following the robot’s recommendation less often. No other mediation effects were found. From this we conclude, that the verbal communication style alone has a rather small influence on the robot’s acceptance as an advisor for moral decision-making and does not reduce algorithm aversion. Potential reasons for this (e.g., multimodality, no visual changes), as well as implications (e.g., avoidance of self-disclosure in human-robot interaction) and limitations (e.g., video interaction) of this study, are discussed.

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Section: The Impact Of Social Communicationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Increased morality through social communication or decision situation worsens the acceptance of robo-advisors

Arlinghaus,

Strassmann,

Dix

2024

Preprint

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“…(ibid., 119). This is a controversial view about the nature of emotions and feelings, as several commentators have pointed out (Wilkins 2002;Konzelmann Ziv 2007;Schmid 2009), but it allows Gilbert to construct a straightforward account of shared emotions on the basis of sharing their cognitive content.…”

Section: Gilbert On Collective Guilt and Other Collective Emotionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Shared emotions

Salmela

2012

Philosophical Explorations

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Existing scientific concepts of group or shared or collective emotion fail to appreciate several elements of collectivity in such emotions. Moreover, the idea of shared emotions is threatened by the individualism of emotions that comes in three forms: ontological, epistemological, and physical. The problem is whether or not we can provide a plausible account of "straightforwardly shared" emotions without compromising our intuitions about the individualism of emotions. I discuss two philosophical accounts of shared emotions that explain the collectivity of emotions in terms of their intentional structure: Margaret Gilbert's plural subject account, and Hans Bernhard Schmid's phenomenological account. I argue that Gilbert's view fails because it relegates affective experience into a contingent role in emotions and because a joint commitment to feel amounts to the creation of a feeling rule rather than to an emotion. The problems with Schmid's view are twofold: first, a phenomenological fusion of feelings is not necessary for shared emotions, and second, Schmid is not sensitive enough to different forms of shared concerns. I then outline my own typology that distinguishes between weakly, moderately, and strongly shared emotions on the basis of the participants' shared concerns of different degree of collectivity on the one hand and the synchronization of their emotional responses on the other hand. All kind of shared emotions in my typology are consistent with the individualism of emotions, while the question about "straightforward sharing" is argued to be of secondary importance.

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“…Konzelmann (2007) argues that guilt is out of place for members who did not directly contribute to the wrongdoing, and that it is more appropriate for them to feel regret.16Frank Hindriks © 2018 The Author dialectica © 2018 Editorial Board of dialectica…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Collective Agency: Moral and Amoral

Hindriks

2018

Dialectica

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Proponents of corporate moral responsibility have provided a number of accounts of moral collective agency. But these accounts do not shed light on how a collective agent might fail to be a moral agent. I explain the difference between moral and amoral collective agents in terms of the notion of a normative perspective. I argue that, in order for a collective agent to be a moral agent, it has to have a normative perspective that is suitably supported by its members. I develop this idea both from a rationalist and from a sentimentalist point of view. According to the rationalist proposal, the members have to collective accept the normative perspective. The sentimentalist proposal also requires that it be suitably supported by collective member emotions. These simulate the epistemic and volitional roles that genuine corporate emotions would play. The upshot is that an amoral collective agent either lacks a normative perspective altogether, or that its normative perspective is not suitably supported by its members.

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Collective Guilt Feeling Revisited

Cited by 12 publications

References 17 publications

Increased morality through social communication or decision situation worsens the acceptance of robo-advisors

Increased morality through social communication or decision situation worsens the acceptance of robo-advisors

Shared emotions

Collective Agency: Moral and Amoral

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